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ABSTRACT
MANAGING THE DISCOVERY LIFE CYCLE OF A FINITE RESOURCE:
A CASE STUDY OF U.S. NATURAL GAS
by
Roger F. Naill
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management
May 12, 1972
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
In an economy such as that of the United States whose growth is based
on exponentially increasing usage of nonrenewable resources, policy makers
need management tools to ensure a long-term supply of these resources at
acceptable prices. This thesis presents a System Dynamics simulation model
of the factors controlling the discovery life cycle of a nonrenewable re-
source. The model is fitted to data from the U.S. natural gas industry as
a case study.
Classical mineral economic theory dictates that continued use of a
finite nonrenewable resource will lead eventually to a price at which
consumption of the resource drops effectively to zero. It is important
for policy makers to understand how alternative price, technology, and
exploration policies will influence the amount and price of the resource
available over time. This study indicates that in the case of finite,
nonrenewable resources such as the fossil fuels, the normal behavior mode
of the system is an initial period of exponential growth in consumption,
a period of rising prices where growth in consumption is halted, and finally
a decline in consumption.
The exact timing of the occurrence of the end of growth is determined
by many factors, including, for instance, the growth rate of potential
usage, the initial level of unproven reserves, the shape of the cost of
exploration curve, and the occurrence of various policies such as subsidies
or ceiling price regulations. It appears that the short-term effectiveness
of such policies which aim at postponement of a decline of usage rate is
minimal. Price regulation greatly reduces the long-term level of reserves
available, however.
A detailed statistical analysis was performed in order to obtain better
estimates of the nonlinear relationships in the model. This analysis pro-
vides a better fit to historical data, but does not alter the overall behav-
ior modes of the model, or the response of the model to various sensitivity
or policy tests.
Thesis Supervisor: Dennis L. Meadows
Title: Assistant Professor of Management
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . .......... ..... . 5
LIST OF FIGURES ................... .... 6
I. INTRODUCTION ................... ...... 9
II. EVALUATION OF OTHER MODELS OF THE U.S. NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY . 13
Static Economic Models . ................. 14
Dynamic Econometric Models .. . . . . . . . . ... . 18
Single-Equation Models: The Khazzoom Model . .... 19
Simultaneous-Equations Models: The MacAvoy Model . . 21
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
III. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DISCOVERY OF U.S. NATURAL GAS . ...... 28
Model Assumptions . ........ ......... .. . 28
Description of the Model . ............ . ... 30
Loop 1: Discovery Loop . ................ 33
Loop 2: Demand Loop . .................. 57
IV. INCORPORATION OF EMPIRICAL DATA . .............. 69
The Use of Linear Statistical Methods for Parameter Esti-
mation in System Dynamics Models. ............ . 69
Parameterization of the Natural Gas Model . ....... 74
Comparison of Model Behavior with Historical Data . . . . 92
Implications of Statistical Data Analysis for System Dynamics
Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
V. DESCRIPTION OF MODEL BEHAVIOR AND EVALUATION OF POLICIES . . .100
General Model Behavior: The Unregulated Industry ... .100
System Behavior Under Regulation ............ .103
Effects of an increase in the Estimate of Unproven Reserves
Effects of an Alaska Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effects of a Change in Growth of Potential Demand . . . .
Effects of an Improvement in Exploration Technology . . .
Government Subsidy of Exploration Costs . . . . . . . . .
Effects of De-Regulation in 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary of Policy Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH . . . . . . . .
General Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Potential for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . .. . . .
APPENDIX I: COMPLETE LIST OF MODELING ISSUES CRITICAL
FPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX II: HISTORICAL DATA . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX III: SYNTHETIC DATA ANALYSIS . .......
APPENDIX IV: LISTING OF COMPUTER PROGRAM . .....
TO THE
. . . .
107
109
111
111
113
116
116
119
119
121
123
126
128
134
139
. . . .
5LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
Table 1: Discovery and Production of U.S. Natural
Gas, 1960-1970 ........................................10
Table 2: Effects of Policies on System Behavior ............... 118
Table AIII-1: Example of Synthetic Data.......................136
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES
Figure
Figure
Figure 3:
Figure 4:
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
PAGE
Russell Field Price Model ...........................15
Causal Loop Diagram of the U. S. Natural Gas
Discovery Model....................................25
Dynamo Flow Diagram of the U. S. Natural Gas
Discovery Model: Unregulated Case..................33
Dynamo Flow Diagram of the U. S. Natural Gas
Discovery Model: Regulated Case ................... 34
Cost of Exploration Table...........................38
Oil/ft. Drilled vs. Cumulative Feet Drilled.........39
New Contract Price, 1954-1969 (1958 Dollars)........45
Effects on Average Wellhead Price of a Step
Rise in Total Cost..................................49
Percent Invested in Exploration Table...............52
Return on Investment Multiplier Table ...............54
Drilling Expenditures and Discoveries, 1959-1969 ....55
Khazzoom Model Response of Discoveries to a
One-Cent Impulse Rise in Price......................57
Demand Loop.......................................58
Actual Time Before Depletion v. RPR at Various
Growth Rates......................................59
Price Multiplier Table..............................62
Demand Multiplier Table.............................64
Usage Supply Multiplier Table.......................66
FIGURES
Figure 18;
Figure 19:
Figure 20:
Figure 21:
Figure 22:
Figure 23:
Figure 24:
Figure 25:
Figure 26:
Figure 27:
Figure 28:
PAGE
Results of Synthetic Data Analysis of the
Cost of Exploration Table CQFT ......................... 78
Data and Regression Results for the Price
Multiplier Table (log-linear scale) .................. 80
Results of Synthetic Data Analysis of the
Price Multiplier Table PMT...........................82
Demand Multiplier Table DMT and Historical
Data ................................................ 83
Results of Synthetic Data Analysis
on the Demand Multiplier Table DMT...................84
Results of Synthetic Data Analysis on
the Usage Supply Multiplier Table USMT...............86
Correlation of New Contract Price/Total Cost
With Reserve-Production Ratio,1955-1967 .............. 89
Real-World and Model-Generated Data Relating
Percent Invested in Exploration PIIE, New
Contract Price divided by Total Cost NCP/TC,
and Reserve-Production Ratio RPR .....................91
Real-World and Model-Generated Data for Unproven
Reserves, Discovery Rate, Proven Reserves, and
Usage Rate.........................................93
Real-World and Model-Generated Data for New
Contract Price, Average Wellhead Price, Cost of
Exploration, and Reserve-Production Ratio............94
Behavior of the Model with and without regulation
before Statistical Analysis ..........................97
FIGURES
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
PAGE
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
Figure 36:
Figure 37:
Figure 38:
Behavior of the Model with and without regulation
after Statistical Analysis .......................... 98
Unregulated Baseline Run...........................101
Run With Ceiling Price Regulation .................. 104
Regulated Run with Noise Elements .................. 106
Regulated Run with 2,080 Trillion Cubic
Feet Estimated Initial Reserves.....................108
Regulated Run with Alaska Discovery in 1975.........110
Effects of a Change in Growth in Potential
Demand to 2 percent in 1970 on the Regulated Run.... 112
Effects on the Regulated Run of an Improvement
in Exploration Technology Beginning in 1972.........114
Regulated Run with 25 percent Subsidy on
Exploration Costs in 1972...........................115
Effects on the Regulated Run if the Industry
were De-Regulated in 1972.............................117
CHAPTER I
INTRQDUCTION
The United States today depends on the fossil fuels coal, oil, and
natural gas for 96 percent of its energy supply.1 Although the total amount
of fossil fuel reserves is not precisely known, it is finite and nonrenew-
able during time periods of less than millions of years. Coal is still in
relative abundance. It has been estimated that the United States' coal
reserves have a current ratio of recoverable reserves to production of
2,620.2 At a projected rate of growth of production of 5 percent per year,
however, these reserves would last only a century. It also has been esti-
mated that more than half of the total U.S. supplies of petroleum have been
consumed. The U.S. became a net importer of oil in 1948 and has become
increasingly dependent on foreign sources despite government limitations
of oil imports. 3 It has been suggested that U.S. oil production reached
its historical peak near 1970, and that production will decline henceforth
until economic depletion.
The natural gas industry seems to be facing the most imminent crisis of
all. The United States depends on natural gas for over thirty percent of
its energy supply. Although it has been estimated that from 400 to 900
1) Statistical Abstract of the United States 1970, U.S. Government Printing
Office, (1970) P. 506,
2) Mineral Facts and Problems, 1970, [Washington] U.S. Dept. of the Interior,
Bureau of Mines, (1970) p. 35,
3) Ibid., p. 168.
4) M. K. Hubbert, "Energy Resources", in NAS-NRG, Resources and Man,
W. H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco, (1969), p. 183.
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trillion cubic feet of natural gas still remains undiscovered in the U.S.,5
proven reserves have been falling rapdily since 1967. The discovery rate
DR, currently less than the production rate PR, is decreasing, while pro-
duction of natural gas is rising at almost seven percent per year.6 The
trends in proven reserves, discovery and production of natural gas over the
past decade are shown in Table 1.
Discoveries
Proven plus extensions R/P
Reserves and revision Production Ratio
Year (trillion ft ) (trillion ft ) (trillion ft ) (Years)
1960 262.3. 13.9 13.0 20.2
1961 266.3 17.2 13.4 20.0
1962 272.3 19.5 13.6 20.0
1963 276.2 18.2 14.5 19.2
1964 281.3 20.3 15.3 18.4
1965 286.5 21.3 16.3 17.6
1966 289.3 20.2 17.5 16.5
1967 292.9 21.8 18.4 15.9
1968 287.3 13.7 19.4 14.9
1969 275.2 8.5 20.7 13.3
1970 266.2 12.7 21.7 12.3
TABLE 1: DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF U.S.
(1960-1970)
NATURAL GAS
The producers of natural gas cite price regulation as the major cause
for decreasing discoveries: "'Frankly, there is no incentive for wild-
catting,' says W.W. Keeler, chairman of Phillips Petroleum Co., a major
5) Ibid., p. 188.
6) M.K. Hubbert, "Energy Resources," in W.W. Murdock, Ed., Environment:
Resources, Pollution and Society, Sinauer Assoc., Inc.,Stamford, Conn.
(1971), p. 97.
7) American Gas Association, Gas Facts, 605 Third Ave., N.Y., 10016.
gas producer. "Until there is a break in these FPC regulations,' he adds,
'I don't think we'll spend a lot of money trying to find gas.'",8 Others
outside the industry contend that a decline in the overall supply of gas
is beginning to have an impact on rates of discovery.
What are the major factors controlling long-term discovery of fossil
fuel and other resources? It is immediately apparent that if a resource is
finite and nonrenewable, a trade-off between short and long-term goals is
necessary. With a finite resource one can enjoy a high usage rate for a
relatively short period of time, depleting resources quickly, or one can
sustain a lower usage rate over a longer period. What then are the effects
of government policies such as ceiling price regulation or tax incentives
on the short and long-term behavior of discovery and usage rates of a
resource?
The answer to these questions depends on many factors including, for
example, the estimate of existing reserves in the U.S., the cost of explo-
ration, investment in exploration, price of the resource, sales revenue,
proven reserves, demand, and usage rate. Rather good data are available on
each of these factors, but their interaction over time is not intuitively
obvious. 9 Nor are traditional econometric tools fully suitable for making
long-term projections over a period where one can expect significant rever-
sals of trends in price, discovery rate, usage rate, etc. However, tools
developed at M.I.T. over the past fifteen years in the System Dynamics Group
8) Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1971.
9) see J.W. Forrester, "Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems,"
M.I.T. Technology Review, V. 73, No. 3, (Jan. 1971) for a discussion of
this point.
do permit the representation for analysis (through simulation) of complex
relationships like those important in determining the rate of natural gas
discovery and usage. These tools are described in several texts,10 and
have been used to study the behavior of many other systems.11
In this report, a System Dynamics model of discovery of U.S. natural
gas is developed as an example of the dynamics of the natural resource dis-
covery process. This model permits one to test, through simulation, the
probable effects of alternative policies on the discovery life cycle of the
resource.
Chapter II evaluates three existing models of the U.S. natural gas
industry in terms of model criteria established by the FPC. Chapter III
presents the System Dynamics model of discovery of U.S. natural gas, and
describes in detail the functional relationships among variables included
in the model. Chapter IV analyzes the applicability of linear statistical
inference methods to an attempt to obtain better estimates of model para-
meters using time series data. The implications of various possible and
existing policies on the supply of natural gas are discussed in Chapter V.
Chapter VI discusses the major conclusions to be drawn from the work to date,
and the potential for further research.
10) J.W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics, M.I.T. Press,Cambridge, Mass.(1961),
J.W. Forrester, Principles of Systems, Wright-Allen Press, Cambridge,
Mass., (1968).
A.L. Pugh, Dynamo II User's Manual, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass.,(1970).
11) For example, see [Meadows (1970)], [Randers, Meadows (1972)], [Hamilton,
et. al. (1969)].
CHAPTER II
EVALUATION OF OTHER MODELS OF THE
U.S. NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
The U.S. natural gas industry provides an excellent example of a socio-
economic system where simulation modeling can provide useful information to
government policy makers. The gas industry has been regulated by the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) since 1954. This one agency must make regu-
latory decisions affecting over three thousand separate companies and over
four billion dollars in annual revenues. In a search for models to aid in
policy making, the FPC has compiled a list of fifteen issues critical to
future policy decisions (included as Appendix I). The following four points
summarize the general model characteristics necessary to address these
issues:
1. The model must show the behavior of reserves, discoveries,
price, and production over time; thus the model must be
dynamic in nature.
2. The model should include the important economic relationships
among new reserves, price, demand, revenue, and capital
investment.
3. The time horizon for the model is relatively long-term
(20 years) - the FPC is interested in estimates of supply
for the next two decades to the year 1990.
4. The model should be capable of testing the effects of
various possible policies such as regulation, technolo-
gical improvements or tax treatments on long-term supply.
Many ,podels of various aspects of the U.S. natural gas industry have
been developed to date. The models belong to two general categories: static
economic models and dynamic econometric models. The purpose of this chapter
is to present examples from each of these two model classes and to evaluate
the models' usefulness as management tools for long-term policy planning.
Static Economic Models
The term "static economic model" here refers to any analysis using
classic supply and demand curves, or schedules of quantities of gas that
would be supplied or demanded, ceteris paribus, at various prices. The
qualifier ceteris paribus is an important one, since it requires that other
factors such as cost of gas, population, and per capita consumption of gas
be held constant.
An example of a static economic model of the gas industry is given by
Milton Russell in "Producer Regulation for the 1970's. '"12 In this analysis,
Russell attempts to evaluate the distributive effects of area price regu-
lation as it is currently being practiced by the FPC. Distribution effects
arise because the Natural Gas Act states that regulation only applies to
interstate sales. Intra-state sales and direct industrial sales by the
producer to the ultimate consumer are exempted from regulation. These
exempt or non-jurisdictional sales have comprised approximately one-half
of total gas sales by volume in recent years.
12) M. Russell, "Producer Regulation for the 1970's," first draft of a
paper to be included in an RFF volume edited by Keith Brown, (1971).
The model assumes there is one single supply function for the aggre-
gated U.S. gas industry, indicated by line S in Figure 1. The demand for
gas is divided into jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional demand components,
BR and AM respectively. If there were no regulation or restrictions on
interstate price, the market clearing price Pe would hold in both the juris-
dictional and non-jurisdictional markets, with Qe the total amount sold.
0 L L' M QsN J Qe R Qd U QUANTITY
Figure 1: Russell Field Price Model
OL would be sold in the non-jurisdictional market and ON would be sold in
the jurisdictional market.
Suppose we impose a ceiling price Pr below the market price Pe on the
jurisdictional market for gas. In this case the total amount demanded Qd
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exceeds the total amount supplied Qs. 13 Russell argues that the same price
Pr will exist for both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional customers, for
if the unregulated price were higher, producers would shift sales from
regulated to unregulated markets. This would tend to drive the unregulated
price down to equal Pr'
Thus, with Pr below Pe, amount OQs would be supplied, with OL' going
to the unregulated market, and the remaining L'Qs available for purchase by
jurisdictional consumers. As compared with the unregulated market, a
ceiling price Pr below Pe expands the amount of gas going to the nonjuris-
dictional market, and restricts jurisdictional sales causing a shortage
for interstate markets.
Russell concludes that regulation has led to a misallocation of re-
sources, and to gas shortages in the regulated markets. Under the ceteris
paribus assumptions in his Field Price Model, he finds regulation reduces
economic welfare in the short-term by allocational inefficiencies.
These ceteris paribus assumptions limit the usefulness of the model as
a tool for long-term management of resources, however. Over the long time
period involved, total demand is being forced up exponentially at over six
percent per year because of growth in population and in per capita consump-
tion of gas. At the same time, the cost of producing gas is rising (be-
cause of the difficulty of finding new reserves of gas), reducing the supply
13) There exists ample evidence that this is the case presently in the
U.S. natural gas industry. In a Washington Post article, March 2, 1972,
entitled "Gas Firm Restricts Sales in District Area," W.H. Jones states,
Washington Gas Light Co. yesterday stopped all sales of natural gas to new
customers in the metropolitan area and said it could not increase sales of
gas to any present customer. Cutbacks of gas sales have become common
throughout the Midwest and Middle Atlantic states in recent months because
of severe shortages of natural gas."
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of gas at any given price. It is clear, then, that both supply and demand
curves will shift substantially over the long time horizon held by the FPC.
The first criterion of the list of model characteristics necessary to
address critical FPC issues states that the model must permit analysis of
the behavior of the industry over time. In utilizing a static model such
as the Field Price Model for long-term analysis, it is possible that viola-
tions of the ceteris paribus assumptions could either invalidate the con-
clusions drawn from the model, or cause a dynamic behavior that completely
overshadows the effects predicted by the static model. In analyzing regu-
lation policies in terms of welfare and optimal resource allocation, it
seems imperative to take the time dimension into account. Over such a long
time frame as twenty years, it is conceivable that short-term welfare
benefits or losses may result in long-term effects of the opposite nature
(this point will be discussed more fully in Chapter V).
Some static analyses have attempted to include the effects of supply
and demand schedules which shift over time. However, when conjectures
about dynamic behavior are made verbally rather than modeled explicitly, it
is difficult to come to any concrete conclusions about relative magnitudes
or even directions of policy effects. If verbal assumptions are included
explicitly in a dynamic model, one often finds results which run counter to
one's initial intuition. Russell is certainly aware of this danger. He
states that "the dynamic effects of gas regulation would appear to reinforce
the results of the static model, though this conclusion is based only on
casual observation and on behavioral assumptions which are plausible, but
which have not been demonstrated."14
14) M. Russell, "Special Group Interests in Natural Gas Price Policy,"
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, (1971) (unpublished
paper).
Dynamic Econometric Models
In order to avoid the restrictions of the ceteris paribus assumptions
of static analyses, most of the models of the natural gas industry are
dynamic in nature. The most common type of dynamic models are econometric
models, where a linear relationship is hypothesized between a dependent
variable at time t and one or more independent variables at time t or t-l.
The normal statistical procedure for estimation of the coefficients which
define the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables
is Ordinary Least Squares analysis (OLS). In order for OLS to give un-
biased estimates of the real-world parameters, the system generating the
real-world data should meet several requirements:
1. The real-world system should be in the same form as the
model. In the case of OLS, the system should be intrinsically
linear. That means that each dependent variable Y. should
1
be a linear function of the dependent variables Xi:
Yi = AB + Xil +BXi2 + Xi3 + '" + i i = 1, 2,...,n
2. The residuals fi (the amount of variance which the equation
has not been able to explain) must be random, normally
distributed, and uncorrelated with the Xij (independent
variables) or Yi (dependent variables).
3. The Xij must be independent with respect to each other, and
must not depend on Yi-i.e., they must be exogenous.
4. Projections should only be made within the range of observed
data. Prediction outside this range is subject to substantial
error--the variance of the predicted value increases with the
square of the distance from the mean of the observations.
Most economic systems violate one or more of thz assumptions on
which OLS techniques are based. One must be careful, therefore, that in
using the model to address specific issues such as those designated by the
FPC, the violations of assumptions do not significantly reduce the utility
of the model.
The following two types of dynamic econometric models are both de-
signed to cope to varying degrees with the assumptions necessary for econo-
metric analysis of the U.S. natural gas industry. The first, the FPC
staff's econometric model developed by J. Daniel Khazzoom, is a single-
equation model estimated using OLS. The second, a simultaneous equations
model developed by P. MacAvoy, uses two-stage least squares regression
techniques.
Single-Equation Models: The Khazzoom Model
J. Daniel Khazzoom has developed a dynamic econometric model of the
U.S. natural gas industry typical of those which use OLS regression techni-
ques. It is employed as the FPC staff's econometric model of natural gas
supply in the United States. 15 More complicated single-equation models of
the gas industry have been developed by others,16 but these models are
similar in that price is considered exogenous in each, and all report similar
results and conclusions. The Khazzoom model is dynamic in nature, and
assumes linear single-equation relationships for new discoveries ND and
15) J. Daniel Khazzoom, "FPC Staff's Econometric Model of Natural Gas Supply
in the United States," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1971).
16) See F.M. Fisher, Supply and Costs in the U.S. Petroleum Industry, Two
Econometric Studies, Bal timore,-- MdT., To-ns I-opkins Press,(1964) or
E.W. Erickson and R.M. Spann, "Supply Response in a Regulated Industry:
the Case of Natural Gas," Bell Journal of Economics and Mgt. Science,
Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring, 1971), p. 99 .
extensions and revisions XR, which together comprise the supply of new gas.
Both are assumed to have a lagged linear dependency on the price of gas,
oil, and natural gas liquids, and each includes carryover effects from the
preceding year. The relationships are:
NDt t= 1 Ct-i 2.- ND + t
XRt =Po +)lCt - P2POt +l 3 6t +'P4NDt-1 +#5XRt-1 + t
where ND = new discoveries
XR = extensions and revisions
C = ceiling price of gas
Po = price of oil
PL = price of natural gas liquids
This model formulation contains implicitly a number of assumptions.
First, the dependency of price is assumed to be linear (a quadratic model
is tested, but results are not significantly different from the linear
model). Price is assumed exogenous, and is the only exogenous variable
affecting supply. With these assumptions, Khazzoom performs an OLS analysis
on data from 1961-1968 and 1961-1969, and estimates that discoveries in
1970 will suffer a drop of 20-26 percent (in comparison with 1969 discov-
eries). In addition, he performs a sensitivity analysis to see how future
discoveries respond to various increases in gas prices.
When used to predict supply response over short-term periods, the
Khazzoom model performs well, predicting 1969 discoveries with about a
5 percent error. When policy makers such as the FPC become concerned with
the long-term, however, it is clear many of the underlying assumptions of
the Khazzoom model are invalid. Khazzoom notes that over longer periods
21
of perhaps ten years or more, discoveries may be decreased due to depletion
of resources, a factor omitted from his model.17 Depletion yay also affect
gas price by increasing the cost of gas. Thus there may exist an inter-
relationship between price and new discoveries over the long run which
would cause price to increase with additional discoveries, violating
Khazzoom's assumption that price is exogenous. In addition, it is likely
that other factors besides price (such as increasing costs or sales revenue)
affect discoveries in the long-term, and that these variables are also
interdependent in the long run. Thus a single-equation model such as
Khazzoom's is valid for short-term projections, but is not a good tool for
evaluating the alternative policies which may be employed in the long-term
management of U.S. natural gas reserves.
When a system contains variables which are interdependent as in the
case of supply of natural gas in the U.S., the model can generally be put
in the form of a simultaneous equation system. An excellent example of
this approach is the model developed by P.W. MacAvoy of M.I.T.
Simultaneous-Equations Models: The MacAvoy Model
P.W. MacAvoy of M.I.T. has developed a simultaneous-equations model
of the U.S. natural gas industry1 8 which recognizes the longer-term inter-
dependencies among parameters. MacAvoy develops equations for price, new
discoveries, production, and well drilling activity for various regions
in the U.S. The model is fitted to data from 1955-1960 (before regula-
tion), and then used to predict price and discoveries in the period
17) J. D. Khazzoom, Op. Cit. (1971), p. 58.
18) P. W. MacAvoy, "The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas," The
Journal of Law and Economics, Volume XIV(1), (April, 1971), p. 167.
1961-1967 (during regulation). If the model is realistic and the coef-
ficients obtained from pre-regulation data are correct, then the differ-
ence between simulated and actual results can be attributed to regulation
effects. MacAvoy concludes from this modeling effort that without regu-
lation, price of natural gas would have more than doubled, and discoveries
would have substantially increased during the period 1961-1967.
MacAvoy's econometric model of supply and demand consists of the
following four simultaneous equations for new discoveries, wells drilled,
production, and price of gas:
log 4R = 0.2765 + .5894 log (4Rtlj) + .4364 log (W );R 2 = .9400
(.0292) (.0489)
log Wtj = 32.0582 + 1.0296 log (Ptj) + 6.7314 log (fpt)
(0.1206) (0.5656)
+ 0.6872 log (Wtj );R 2 = .9848
(0.6188)
log Qtj = 44.7285 + 1.1091 log (4~tj) + 1.1567 log (it)
(0.0322) (0.3514)
- 10.9032 log (fpt);R 2 = .9528
(1.9389)
A A A
log Ptj = 28.8494 + 0.1210 log (&Rtj) - 0.7138 log (ARtj)
(0.0055) (0.0879) 3
- 0.1232 log (Mj) + 6.6067 log (fpt) + 1.3798 log (ANAY);R2 = .9205
(0.0461) (0.8726) (0.1131)
where ARtj = new reserve in year t, district j
Wtj = wells drilled in year t, district j
AQtj = production from new contracts signed in year t,
district j
Ptj = average price during time t, district j
fPt = all-fuels price index in year t
it = current rate of interest in year t (as a measure
of cost of investment in reserves)
M. = distance from point of production to final markets
in district j
&NAY =(population increase)x(per capita income increase)
Literature on regression techniques19 warns that estimates of coeffi-
cients in a simultaneous equations system obtained through Ordinary Least
Squares analysis will tend to be biased (i.e., they will not be equal to
the real-world relationships). In order to rid the estimates of the
coefficients of bias in his simultaneous equations model, MacAvoy used a
procedure known as "Two-Stage Least Squares." He regresses each dependent
variable against the exogenous variables, and then uses the predicted
values of the dependent variables to estimate coefficients in the "second
stage" of the regression (thereby specifying the equations shown above).
With this technique, he reports high R2 coefficients for all four equations
when based on data from the East Coast and Mid-West markets. When the
model was extended to the West Coast markets, however, some coefficients
had wrong signs, and the R2 values were much lower. He attributes this
lack of fit to the monopsony pipeline control of prices in the West in
the 1950's, a factor which could not be expected to continue through the
1960's given that a substantial number of pipelines entered the demand
side of the market during the later period.
How well does MacAvoy's model address the FPC criteria for models of
the gas industry listed earlier? The model is dynamic in nature, explaining
19) See, for example, J. Johnston, Econometric Methods, McGraw-Hill, N.Y.,
(1963), p. 233.
the behavior of reserves, discoveries, price, and production over time.
The model does include the important economic relationships for the time
period on which it is based. In this sense, it is useful for the time
period which it analyzes--in this case, 1955-1968. The FPC is interested
in a model which explains behavior up through 1990, however. When linear
statistical models are used to analyze long-term behavior of a system,
several problems may arise.
First, many of the variables can be expected to go out of the range
in which estimations were made--in the case of natural gas, costs and
production are rising, price is regulated, and discoveries are falling,
causing the reserve-production ratio to decrease in recent years to unpre-
cidented levels. It is clear that some powerful forces are building up in
the industry, and that one cannot expect trends to continue through 1990
as they have in the past. This implies that the system may well be non-
linear. When one assumes an intrinsically linear form in a nonlinear
system and estimates coefficients based on behavior in a limited range of
variation of the variables, it is important to remember that the error in
prediction increases greatly when using these coefficients to predict be-
havior outside that variable range. Because of the nonlinearities, be-
havior may actually be quite different, causing the model to project incor-
rectly the effects of policies on the gas industry over the long term.
In addition, it is often possible that when one lengthens the time
horizon of the model, the primary determinants of behavior may be substan-
tially different. In the very long-term, for instance, costs of explora-
tion for reserves may become a major component of price as gas becomes
more scarce. These rising costs also decrease the quantity of gas
25
discovered at a given level of investment, and thus affect discovery rate
of new reserves.
Dynamic econometric models predict system behavior well when real-
world relationships can be assumed linear in the range of behavior, and
the real-world system can not be expected to show long-term behavior which
deviates widely from the range in which the estimation was made. Over the
long term (through 1990), however, one would expect to see the effects of
diminishing returns in investment in exploration for gas--in the long run,
discoveries must decrease due to rising costs of exploration, caused by
continual depletion of a finite resource. Evidence cited in Appendix II
does indicate that diminishing returns due to rising costs were a factor
during the 1960's. The MacAvoy model will not reflect diminishing returns-
-new reserves 4Rtj are assumed to be some constant times the number of
wells drilled Wtj, while in the long term this constant will actually de-
crease due to diminishing returns.
In addition, one would expect the number of variables which can be
considered exogenous to the system to diminish when the model is used to
explain long-term behavior. For instance, fuel prices fpt' treated as
exogenous in the MacAvoy model, will certainly be a function of gas price
P in the long term. This effect can cause problems of identification in
ti
long-term econometric models, which limit the applicability of linear
regression techniques to long-term system modeling. This issue will be
discussed more fully in Chapter IV.
Summary
In order to avoid simulation modeling as a purely academic exercise,
and to increase the number of models actually used to solve practical
problems of policy making, models should be built with the user in mind.
A powerful potential user of simulation models in government is the Fed-
eral Power Commission, which regulates the natural gas industry. To
elicit help in determining the effects of regulatory policies on the U.S.
natural gas industry, the FPC has provided a list of criteria for prospec-
tive models. The criteria listed in full in Appendix I can be summarized
as: dynamic capability, long time frame (through 1990), capability of
including all the important economic relationships simultaneously, and
flexibility in testing of alternative policies.
With these criteria in mind, two types of models of the U.S. natural
gas industry were examined. The first, static economic models, were found
to be too restrictive because the large number of ceteris paribus assump-
tions inherent in the models were severely violated over the long term in
the case of natural gas supply and demand. Demand is increasing at almost
seven percent per year. Costs of finding gas may be expected to rise
sharply over the long term, forcing the supply curve to shift. Imports
can be expected to rise in the future, and extraction and exploration
technologies will improve, also shifting the supply curve.
The second type of models, dynamic econometric models, require fewer
ceteris paribus assumptions than static models because they can include
the effects of interactions among variables through time. Because of the
very long time frame of interest to the FPC, parameters can be expected
to vary beyond the range of estimation, making prediction of long-term
policy effects tenuous in those cases. In addition, assumptions of linear-
ity made in most econometric models are invalid over the wide variation of
variables which can be expected in the long term.
Thus the two types of models (static, dynamic econometric) most
commonly used to analyze the U.S. natural gas industry may be useful tools
to evaluate short-term effects of policies, but they are not well suited
for an extremely long-term framework such as that required by the FPC.
What is needed is a modeling technique which enables explicit incorpor-
ation of all nonlinearities and feedback interrelationships which signi-
ficantly influence the system's behavior.
A third methodology, System Dynamics, appears better suited to meet
the model criteria outlined by the FPC. The modeling technique is dynamic,
and capable of including simultaneously all the important factors control-
ling long-term supply of a resource. System Dynamics models are especially
well suited to long-term analysis because they can easily incorporate non-
linear relationships.
Finally, the most effective use of System Dynamics models is for
evaluation of policy effects on long-term behavior of a system. It is
impossible to predict the future, but managers can use models to identify
alternative outcomes and to seek policies which will increase the proba-
bility of realizing the desired goals. The following chapter describes
a System Dynamics model of the U.S. natural gas industry, and presents
the assumptions and functional relationships which underlie the model.
CHAPTER III
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DISCOVERY OF U.S. NATURAL GAS
The domestic supply of the fossil fuels seems to be at a turning
point, for it is becoming more and more difficult to supply the fuels
needed to continue past trends in growth of energy consumption from U.S.
sources. The goal of the model presented here is to incorporate the ele-
ments and interactions which control the discovery and supply of U.S.
natural gas, to determine the nature of this turning point in supply,
and to examine the effectiveness of various policies in alleviating the
problem.
Parameter values will be derived from data from the natural gas
industry in the United States. It is important to recognize, however,
that the underlying model structure is representative of other finite,
nonrenewable resources. The end use of fossil fuels dictates that the
process of recycling be excluded from this model. The impact of recycling
on the supply of a mineral resource has been analyzed in a similar model
by Randers [Randers (1971)].
Many aspects of the natural gas industry such as seasonal demand
fluctuations or pipeline distribution problems certainly deserve atten-
tion, but the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of policies
on long-term trends and behavior modes in industry supply. The following
assumptions are those which appear most appropriate for that purpose.
Model Assumptions
The model assumes that the natural gas industry is composed of many
firms, all producing one undifferentiated product, natural gas. The
interdependency between the oil and the gas industry has been ignored for
the purposes of this study. Although this assumption certainly affects
the specific data produced by the model in the early stages of natural gas
discovery, it does not affect overall behavior, or the relative effects of
policies. Furthermore, this assumption is becoming more and more valid at
present. Directional drilling for either gas or oil is becoming more suc-
cessful, and over 70 percent of all gas wells are now un-associated with
oil.20
The model includes those relationships which govern the behavior of
the industry as a whole: the separate producer's actions in discovery and
production are aggregated together to obtain this industry behavior. The
producers of natural gas are taken as those engaged in the discovery of
natural gas and the preparation of gas for use. Pipeline distribution
companies are considered consumers, not producers. The gas is "sold" at
the wellhead, usually under long-term contracts.
The cost of exploration is assumed to be monotonically rising as re-
sources are depleted. Of course the actual cost of exploration contains
random fluctuations, and an example of the model's response to random
fluctuations in cost, new field size, and consumption is shown in Chapter V.
However, data supports the assumption of a long-term relationship between
costs and the fraction of total resources remaining to be discovered.
The individual natural gas industry firms also exhibit an eight to
fifteen year cycle in the reserve-production ratio caused by capacity
20) M.A. Adelman, The Supply and Price of Natural Gas, supp. to Journal
of Industrial Economics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1962.
acquisition delays in building pipelines. It is not the concern of this
paper to model this effect; however an analysis of this behavior can be
found in Meadows [Meadows (1969)].
In the model, demand is assumed to be an endogenous function of pro-
duct price, with other determinants such as growth in population and per
capita consumption causing increased demand at any given price. This rate
of growth in potential demand is determined exogenously to the model, and
is assumed in the case of natural gas to be 6.57 percent per year. 2 1
The model does not explicitly include changes in exploration or extrac-
tion technology, substitution effects, or the effects of imports in its
structure. These effects can, however, be implicitly studied by their in-
fluence on existing parameter values in the model, as will be illustrated
later for extraction technology and imports. The effects of technology
and substitution on resource availability are treated in a separate paper
by William W. Behrens of the M.I.T. System Dynamics Group [Behrens, (1971)].
Description of the Model
Figure 2 is a causal loop diagram which illustrates the major feed-
back loops of the model. The model contains only two major state variables,
or levels, corresponding to unproven reserves UPR 2 2 and proven reserves PR.
Loop 1 is a negative feedback loop interrelating the level of unproven
reserves, the cost of exploration, and the discovery rate. As unproven
reserves are depleted, the cost of exploration rises because less gas is
21) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1971), p. 97.
22) Uppex case letters are used to indicate the abbreviation for each
parameter which is used in the DYNAMO flow diagram (Figure 3).
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found per foot of drilling, and because producers must look in less acces-
sible places. This decreases the discovery rate, slowing the depletion of
unproven reserves. The rise in cost of exploration also increases the
total unit cost of production, which decreases return on investment in
exploration, causing a decrease in investment in exploration. A decrease
in investment in exploration then decreases discovery rate after a few
years delay. The delays included in the system are not indicated in the
causal loop diagram. They are critical determinants of system behavior,
however, and are included explicitly in the system flow diagram and the
model equations.
Loop 2 is the demand loop relating the level of proven reserves,
price, demand, and usage rate. An increase in proven reserves increases
the reserve-production ratio, which decreases new contract price because
of excess coverage. 2 3 A price decrease results in an increase in demand,
increasing usage rate which decreases proven reserves. The increase in
usage rate also increases sales revenue, which increases investment in
exploration, for it is assumed that the industry allocates its investment
in proportion to its revenues. Investment in exploration is decreased
when the reserve-production ratio exceeds a desired coverage, because
the need for further discoveries is momentarily diminished.
Figures 3 and 4 show the variables in the model as related by a
DYNAMO flow diagram with and without the effects of regulation. The fol-
lowing describes the important relationships among the system elements
and presents the mathematical equations which express these relationships
23) Coverage is the number of years one can support current production out
of current inventories, and is equal to the reserve-production ratio.
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in a form suitable for processing by the computer.24 Numbers at the right
indicate the variable's location in the flow diagram.
LOOP 1: DISCOVERY LOOP
Unproven Reserves
UPR. K=UPR. J+ (DT) (-DR. J1) 1, L
UPR=UPRI 1.1, .
UPRI=1.04E15 1.2, C
UPR - UNPROVEN RESERVES (CUBIC FEET)
DT - TIME INCREMENT BETWEEN CALCULATIONS (YEARS)
DR - DISCOVERY RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
UPRI - UNPROVEN RESERVES IIITIAL (CUBIC FEET)
Perhaps the simplest and yet most important concept of the model is
the fact that the total amount of unproven reserves UPR in the system is
finite. The total extent of the reserves will be unknown initially, exist-
ing largely as unproven reserves. Even after those reserves are discovered
they may not be economically exploited, but the total quantity is fixed.
This implies that unproven reserves begin with some initial value UPRI,
and can only decrease over time as unproven reserves are discovered.
There has been much controversy over the estimation of the value of
initial unproven reserves. Because of the close relationship between gas
and oil finds, most gas estimates are based on the results of existing
extensive oil analyses. Estimates of 2,000 trillion cubic feet or more25
have been made on the basis of Zapp's assumption that "oil to be discovered
24) The conventions of DYNAMO are fully explained in DYNAMO II User's
Manual, (Pugh, 1970). Here it is sufficient to note that the equations
are primarily algebraic. J, K and L are used in place of the time sub-
scripts t-l, t, t+l respectively. X.K means the value of X at time K,
X.KL means the value of X over the interval from time K to time L.
25) T.A. Hendricks, "Resources of Oil, Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids in
the United States and the World' U.S. Geol. Survey Circ. 522, (1965).
per foot of exploratory drilling in any given petroliferous region will
remain essentially constant until an areal density of about one exploratory
well per two square miles has been achieved."2 6 Hubbert shows that in
fact discoveries per foot drilled have fallen off exponentially with cumu-
lative footage drilled, and makes an estimate of 1,040 trillion cubic feet
on the basis of this hypothesis. 2 7 Because the Hubbert estimate is de-
rived from the discovery data, his value of 1,040 trillion cubic feet of
initial unproven reserves of gas for the U.S. excluding Alaska and Hawaii
is used in the model. This value can, however, be easily changed from one
simulation run to the next to determine the dynamic implications of alter-
native possible unproven reserve bases. This is done in Chapter V. One
advantage of a simulation model lies in the ease with which one may analyze
the implications of changes in underlying assumptions such as variations
in reserve estimates.
Fraction of Unproven Reserves Remaining
FURR. i=UPR. K/UPR 1 2, A
FURR - FRACTION OF UNPROVEN RESERVES iRE)AAINIrlG
(D IHIENS I ONLESS)
UPR - UNPROVEN RESERVES (CUBIC F EET)
UPRI - UNPROVEN RESERVES INITIAL (CUBIC FEET)
As unproven reserves are depleted, the level of unproven reserves at
any given time divided by the initial amount of unproven reserves UPRI
gives the fraction of unproven reserves remaining to be discovered FURR.
26) M.K. Hubbert, Resources and Man, p. 185. For the original formulation
by Zapp, see A.D. Zapp, "Future Petroleum Producing Capacity of the United
States," U.S. Geol. Survey Bull., 1962, 1142-H.
27) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1969), p. 188.
Cost of Exploration
COE.K=TABILL(COET, LOGN(10*FURR. K), -3.5, 2.5, . 5)* 3, A(COEN)*(CNHi. K )
COEN=1E-5 3.1, CCOET=1.3E4/6E3/2.7E3/1E3/545/245/110/50/22/9.98/ 3.2, T
4 .48/2.02/.91
COE - COST OF EXPLORATIO N (!DOLLARS/CU3I C FOOT)TABHL - TERM DENOTING A TA3ULAR RELATIONSHIP
COET - COST OF EXPLORATIOr' TABLE
LOGN - NATURAL LOGARITIHMIC FUr!CTION'
FURR - FRACTION OF UNPROVEN RESERVES DEA I ' INOI(D I rENSI OrNLESS)
COEN - COST OF EXPLORATION NORMAL (0OLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
CNM - COST NOISE HULTIPLIER (DIMENS1,SIOLESS)
It has been found that for all nonrenewable natural resources, the
cost of exploration is a function of reserves remaining--as reserves are
depleted, the cost of exploration increases.28 Initially, when the frac-
tion of unproven reserves remaining is one, the industry will explore for
new gas reserves in the most accessible places and exploit the largest
fields available, making the cost of exploration relatively low. As most
of the larger deposits are discovered, producers must look in less acces-
sible places like the mountains or off-short Louisiana, causing the cost
of exploration to rise. In addition, the size of reserves found and the
success ratio of wildcat wells drilled decreases, further increasing costs
as the fraction of unproven reserves diminishes. Finally, as the fraction
of unproven reserves remaining approaches zero, cost of exploration ap-
proaches infinity as no more gas can be found at any cost. The graph of
cost of exploration COE as a function of fraction of unproven reserves
remaining FURR is given in Figure 5. Equations 3 and 3.1 above are simply
28) See for example the discussion of costs in [Ayres, Kneese, (1971)] w
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a shorthand notation expressing the relationship between cost of exploration
COE and fraction of unproven reserves remaining FURR shown in Figure 5,
and defined by the table COET multiplied by the normalizing constant COEN.
COET
pr p_ p 1 P
0.5 1.0
Fraction of Unproven Reserves Remaining FURR
FIGURE 5: COST OF EXPLORATION TABLE
According to a study by M. Adelman,2 9 there is little doubt that these
costs are rising: "We must be content with the limited but firm conclusion
that finding cost has almost certainly been on the increase from the late
1940's to the middle 1960's." In fact we can be more precise.
This long-run relationship has been derived from data given in NAS-
NRC's Resources and Man30 relating rate of discovery of oil per foot
drilled as a function of cumulative feet drilled (Figure 6). Hubbert
29) M. A. Adelman, "Trends in Costs of Finding and Developing Oil and
Gas in the U.S.," Essays in Petroleum Economics, Proc. 1967 Rocky Mountain
Petroleum Economics Institute, Colorado School of Mines, (1967), p. 65.
30) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1969), p. 186.
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notes that the rate of gas discovered to oil discovered has averaged about
6,000 ft3/bbl over the past 20 years. The trend towards directional
300 r
S200 * Actual discovery rate
Zap hypochesis 118 bbls/ft
-- - -- - -- -- ---- -- --- --- -- -- ---- -- -- --- --- -- ---
165 x 10 590X109 bbls
bbls
0 I 2 3 4 5
Cumulative Footage h (100 ft)
FIGURE 6: OIL/FT DRILLED VS. CUMULATIVE FEET DRILLED
(After Figure 8.19, Resources and Man)
drilling tends to increase this ratio for the future. We assume, however,
that the gains are largely offset by recently rising costs of drilling
because of the increasing average well depths. 31 With this assumption,
one can derive the cost of exploration COE versus fraction of unproven
reserves remaining FURR curve (Figure 5) from the above curve.
The values of cost of exploration normal COEN and unproven reserves
initial UPRI are set to fit the theoretical curve to the actual data
(Appendix II). This data, as noted by Adelman,32 is extremely difficult
to obtain because of the problem of allocation of costs between oil and
gas, or between exploration and development. An estimate was made by
multiplying total exploration expenditures for oil and gas by the percent-
age of gas wells, weighted by the cost per well (see Appendix II). It is
31) American Petroleum Institute, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, "Joint Association Survey
of Industry Drilling Costs.", (1959-1967).
32) M.A. Adelman, Op. Cit. (1967), p. 58.
40
useful to note here that the shape of the cost of exploration curve, and
not the actual values on the curve is the important factor in determining
system behavior.
Total Cost
TC. ,v= (fIAR) (COE. K) 4., A
f4AR=3.7 4'.1, C
TC - TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUDIC FOOT)
MAAR - COST fiARG il (DI IEINS I -N LESS)
COE - COST OF EXPLORAT I ON (DOLLARS/CUi3 1C FOOT)
During the period 1955-1967, exploration costs remained a relatively
constant fraction of thirty percent of the total exploration, development,
and production costs for the oil and gas industry.3 3 Included in the cost
margin is a profit percentage over costs of 12 percent to cover normal
return on investment. Thus total cost is assumed to be a constant mul-
tiple of 3.7 times the cost of exploration for the natural gas industry.
Determination of Price
Two prices, the new contract price NCP and average wellhead price AWP,
are significant determinants of behavior in the natural gas industry.
The new contract price NCP is a function of total cost TC and the current
producer supply situation, measured by the reserve-production ratio RPR.
The new contract price is used by producers to determine return on invest-
ment in their decision to invest in exploration for new gas reserves.
33) U.S. Energy Study Group, Energy R&D and National Progress, U.S. Gov't.
Printing Office, Wash., D.C. (1964), p. 147. Also American Petroleum
Institute, et.al., Joint Association Survey (Section II), (1967), p. 5.
Average wellhead price is a delayed function of new contract price, and
influences sales revenue and consumption of gas. Both average wellhead
price AWP and new contract price NCP are affected when price regulation
occurs.
New Contract Price
NCP. K=SW I TCH (UNCP. K, RNCP. KI, SM11) 5, A
NCP - NEWJ CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
SWITCH - FUNCTION JHOSE VALUE IS SET INITIALLY DY
ANALYST
UNCP - UNREGULATED NEW0 CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/
CUBIC FOOT)
RNCP -. REGULATED NEW CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
Sll - REGULATION SWITCH
New contract price is represented in the model as a switching function,
whose value is unregulated new contract price UNCP without regulation
(SW1=0), and regulated new contract price RNCP when simulating a run in
which regulation takes place (SW1=1). The regulated new contract price
RNCP is assumed to be a function only of total cost, while the unregulated
new contract price is a function of both total cost and the relative supply
of gas.
When price is a function of relative quantity supplied (through the
reserve-production ratio RPR), it is free to seek an equilibrium level
depending on quantity supplied and quantity demanded. Price regulation
upsets this process, for price is then set on a cost-plus margin basis, and
no longer responds to shortages in supply indicated by a low reserve-pro-
duction ratio RPR.
Unregulated New Contract Price
UNCP.K=(TC.K) (PI.!) ., A
UNCP - UNREGUILATEn NEW CONtTRACT P I Cr " (nrI. ARS/
CUtIC FOCOT)
TC - TOTAL COST (I)OLLAIrS/CU' C FrOOT)
PM - PRICF 1HULTIPLIER (F'IltErSII'LESS)
The unregulated new contract price UNCP is equal to total cost plus a
margin whose size is determined by the price multiplier PM. The price
multiplier reflects the producers' new contract price response to relative
abundance or scarcity of reserves. If the reserve-production ratio RPR
is above that desired by the industry, the margin above cost that producers
will charge in establishing new contracts will be relatively small, for
the producers wish to avoid the costs of carrying excess inventory, and
therefore will sell near cost.
The normal gas contract commits a producer to deliver quantities of
gas for an average of 20 years. Thus if the reserve-production ratio is
below 20, the producers run the risk of not being able to fulfill a future
delivery if they choose to sell additional gas now. The alternative is to
tap marginally productive reserves whose costs are higher. In any case a
low reserve-production ratio forces the producers to charge a higher price
for gas.
Regulated New Contract Price
RNCP. K= CL I P (tMAX (I1rP. -K, )DTC. " ) ., Ir! C P. K, T I UtEF. K, 19 55 ) 7, A
Rf!CP - RtEGCULATED IrTNEi CONTRACT PRICE (DrOLLARS/CtU 3 C
FOOT)
CL IP - FUN'CTI1ON J1!SE VALUE CIANCES DVR 1NG RU'
MIAX - FUMtCT I ON * 13 C1 CIO()SES T!E AX I rUt OF TW!O
ARGUPt F I ETS
RP - REGULATION PRICE SCHEDULE (DOLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
DTC - DELAYED TOTAL COST (POLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
UNCP - UNRE(ULATED NEW CONTRACT PRICrCE (DOLLARS
CUBIC FOOT)
TINE - TIME (YEARS)
As a result of the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Phillips Petroleum
Company v. Wisconsin34 the natural gas industry has been subject to price
ceiling regulation by the Federal Power Commission. The price is based on
the producer's operating costs. To represent this regulatory policy in the
model, new contract price is taken as unregulated up to 1955, a year after
the Supreme Court decision. Up to this point new contract prices had been
continually rising, for producers could command a higher price due to
increasing demand for gas. After the Supreme Court decision, however, new
contract prices fell until 1964 and then remained constant at their 1964
level, 35 for regulation imposed ceiling prices which were based on cost
plus a 12 percent margin.36 This effect is formulated as an exogenous
time series RP representing the downward drift of new contract prices from
1955-1964, and a constant value thereafter.
The ceiling prices set in 1960 were admittedly above the cost-plus
margin. They were rationalized as a provision against uncertainties during
the change-over period and an added stimulus to exploratory activity.3 7
Ceiling prices therefore remain near their 1960 level until costs rise
34) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, (1954).
35) F.P.C., Sales by Producers of Natural Gas to Interstate Pipeline
Companies, (1960-1964), Wash. D.C. 20426.
36) R.S. Spritzer, "Changing Elements in the Natural Gas Picture:
Implications for the Federal Regulatory Scheme," first draft of a paper
for RFF volume edited by Keith Brown (1971), p. 12.
37) Ibid., p. 11.
enough to warrant further increases. Because of the difficulties involved
in perceiving cost increases and translating them into new price guide-
lines, a four year perception delay is assumed between actual rises in
total cost and resulting rises in new contract prices.
The simulation of the effects of regulation on new contract price are
as follows: new contract price is assumed unregulated until 1955. In
1955 new contract price is determined exogenously by RP, representing a
transition period where price drifts downward towards the total cost regu-
latory guidelines imposed by the FPC. As costs rise above the 1964 new
contract price level, it is assumed new contract price NCP rises in accor-
dance with a delayed measure of total cost DTC.
Regulated Price Schedule
RP.K=TABIHL(TRP,T I E., 1955, 196 It,9)*(1E-t) 3, A
TRP=1.95/1.6 3.1, T
RP - !),EGULAT I (N P- I CE ý3SCHEMDVJ1LE (n OLLARS/CUl I C
FOOT)
TABIL - TERM DEMOTlNCG A TABULAR, '9FLATIONSHI P
TRP - REGULATED P I CE SCHEDULE TADILE
TIME - TliME (YEARS)
The regulated price schedule RP represents an exogenous time series
reflecting the behavior of regulated new contract price RNCP from 1955
through 1969. Real-World data and the regulated price schedule RP are
graphed in Figure 7. Data are obtained from F.P.C., Sales by Producers
of Natural Gas to Interstate Pipeline Companies.
o0MP4 4-4
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FIGURE 7: NEW CONTRACT PRICE, 1954-1969 (1954 DOLLARS)
Delayed Total Cost
DTC. K=DELAY3(TC. K,REGD) 9, A
REGD=4 9.1, C
DTC - DELAYED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
DELAY3 - TERfl DENOTING A LAGGED RELATIONSHIP
TC - TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CU'IC FOOT)
REGD - REGULATION DELAY (YEARS)
The delayed total cost function represents the delay in response of
the FPC to rises in cost. The inherent difficulties in measuring unit
costs in gas makes any rise in cost uncertain. Even after the cost rise
is perceived, there are additional delays in structuring new rates. The
magnitude of this delay has been approximated by the analysis shown in
Figure 7. When fitted to data, the model reproduces the time series be-
havior of total cost shown in Figure 7. The actual rise in new contract
price can be seen to be delayed behind rises in total cost by about four
years.
Average Wellhead Price
AWP. K=SW I TCII (UAWP. K, RAWP. K, SIl) 10, A
AW P - AVERAGE 'WELLIHEAD PRICE (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
SWITCH - FUNCTION •HIOSE VALUE IS SET INITIALLY BY
ANALYST
UAWP - UNREGULATED AVERAGE 11ELL'_•EAD PRICE
(DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
RAWP - REGULATED AVERAGE W'ELLHEAD PRICE (,OLLARS/
CUBIC FOOT)
Si1 - REGULATION SWITCH
The average wellhead price AWP represents the average price per cubic
foot for all gas sold in a given year. This value determines sales revenue
SR and demand for gas through the demand multiplier DM. Average wellhead
price AWP is controlled by a switching function activated by the regulation
switch SW1, which determines whether average wellhead price will be regu-
lated (SW1=1 implies AWP=RAWP) or unregulated (SW1=0 implies AWP=UAWP).
Unregulated Average Wellhead Price
UA'.P.K=DELAY3(NICP.K, PAD.K) 11, A
UAWP - UNREGULATED AVERAGE •IELLIEAD PRICEF
(DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
DELAY3 - TERM DENOTING A LAGGED RELATIO'NSHIP
,NCP - NIEW CONTRACT PRICE (OOLLARS/CUB IC FOOT)
PAD - PRICE AVERACING DELAY (YEARS)
When wellhead price is unregulated, average wellhead price is simply
a delayed function of new contract price NCP. This represents the fact
that average wellhead price reflects the price of gas sold under all
contracts, new and old. A higher new contract price will not significantly
affect average wellhead price initially, for it must be weighted by the
quantity of gas sold at that price. A continuing trend of rising new con-
tract prices will gradually lead to a rise in average wellhead price after
a delay determined by the average turnover time of gas flowing through
proven reserves PR.
Regulated Average Wellhead Price
RAIIP.tK=CLIP(HAX(PG0,STC.K),UALIP.K,TIM IE.K,1960) 12, A
P60=1.5E-4 12.1, C
RAWP - REGULATED AVERAGE 'JELL!iEAD PRICE (DOLLARS/
CUBIC FOOT)
CLIP - FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE CHANGES DURIHG RUNI
MAX - FUNCTION WHIICH CHOOSES THE M'AXI MUltM OF TWO
ARGUHIENTS
P60 - CEILING PRICE SET IN 1960 (DOLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
STC - SMOOTHED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CU'3IC FOOT)
UAWJP - UNREGULATED AVERAGE W'ELLHEAD PRICE
(DOLLAR',S/CUBIC FOOT)
TIME - TIM4E (YEARS)
The ceiling price regulation imposed by the FPC also has direct effects
on average wellhead price. Regulation of average wellhead prices occurred
effectively in 1960, when a ceiling price was finally set for all pre-1960
contracts (as well as for all new contract prices) after years of negotia-
tion.38 This price was also above the cost-plus-margin guideline, which
established a 12 percent margin above average costs.
Thus to approximate the effects of regulation on the average wellhead
price AWP, the average wellhead price is assumed equal to the unregulated
average wellhead price UAWP until 1960. After 1960, the price is held at
its 1960 level, until average total cost (STC) rises above that value.
From that point on, it is assumed that the FPC will raise the ceiling
average wellhead price AWP in accordance with the cost-plus-margin guide-
line, so average wellhead price AWP becomes equal to smoothed total cost
STC.
38) Ibid., p. 11.
Smoothed Total 'Cost
STC.K,=ELAY3(TC. KPAD.K) 13, A
STC - SMOOTHED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CU31C FOOT)
DELAY3 - TERIM DENOTING A LAGGED RELATION!SH!IP
TC - TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
PAD - PRICE AVERAGING DELAY (YEARS)
The response of average wellhead price AWP to changes in total cost
(when the industry is regulated) or new contract price (when unregulated)
is delayed by a smoothing delay PAD to represent the fact that although
the discovery cost of an additional unit of gas may be high, its impact
on the average wellhead price AWP of proven reserves must be weighted by
the fraction of total proven reserves with the higher price. This is
represented in the model with a delay function. If total cost were to
rise in year ten from five cents/Mcf to ten cents/Mcf, the response of
average wellhead price AWP, represented by a third order delay, is shown
in Figure 8. This representation is not as precise as one which would
keep track of each different cost category of gas and would specify usage
and discovery rates for each. However, the error introduced by this sim-
plification has no influence on the conclusions derived from this model.
It might, however, be important in shorter-term studies of the natural gas
industry.
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RISE IN TOTAL COST
Price Averaging Delay
PAD. K=RPR. K
PAD - PRICE AVERAGING DELAY (YEARS)
RPR - RESERVE-PRODUCT ION RATIO (YEARS)
14i, A
As the cost of exploration rises, the total cost of the new additions
to proven reserves also rises. The average wellhead price of these proven
reserves does not rise immediately in response to changes in the cost of
new reserves, however. In the natural gas industry, reserves are sold to
pipeline of other distribution companies under a long-term contract,
usually twenty years. 39 Thus the average wellhead price in any given year
is associated with revenue from recent contracts negotiated at a higher
price because of rising costs, and with revenue from gas discovered as
much as twenty years ago, when discovery costs were much lower. Assuming
regular cost increases, the cost which affects average wellhead price today
is really total cost averaged over a period of PAD.
39) M.A. Adelman, Op. Cit. (1962), p. 37.
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The value of the price averaging delay PAD depends on the relative
magnitudes of discovery rate DR, level of proven reserves PR, and usage
rate UR. The reserve-production ratio RPR gives a measure of the average
time gas remains in the proven reserve category. If discovery rate and
usage rate were equal, the time delay on cost which would determine the
average wellhead price would be the reserve-production ratio RPR divided
by two. If discovery rate DR were nearly zero, this time delay would be
best represented simply by the value of reserve-production ratio RPR. This
difference in delay representation becomes significant in relation to model
behavior only when discovery rate DR is near zero, so the price averaging
delay PAD is assumed equal to the reserve-production ratio RPR.
Sales Revenue
SR.!K=(UR.JK) (A\P. K) 15, A
SR - SALES REVENUE (F)OLL_ARS)
UR - USAGE RATE (CU5IC FEET/YEAR)
ALIP - AVERAGE  'EILLHEAD) PRI CE (DnOL__ARS/CUIR I C FOO)T)
Sales revenue is simply the product of usage rate and price, reflect-
ing the total revenue obtained from the sale of the resource. The indus-
try's ability to invest in exploration for new reserves is assumed to be
proportional to its current revenue. Thus growth in sales revenue provides
the positive impetus which increases the discovery rate through increased
investment in exploration during the growth phase of the industry.
Investment in Exploration
SIE. K=(PI I E. K) (SR.) 16, A
IE - INVESTHENT IlN EXPLOIRATIC !O (nOLIL, RS)
PIlE - PERCEHT INVESTED ItN EXPLO'ATIOONI (FRPACTI()f!)
SR - SALES REVENUE (DOLLARPS)
The total amount invested in exploration per year is defined to be
equal to the sales revenue for that year multiplied by the percentage of
sales revenue invested in exploration. From historical data it appears
that the industry tends to invest about 35 percent of its sales revenue4 0
when return on investment is adequate and relative supply (RPR) is near
the desired value of 20 years. Deviations dependent on the apparent re-
turn on investment and relative coverage or abundance of reserves, are
reflected in the function PIIE described below.
Percent Invested in Exploration
PI IE.K=TABIIL(PI IET, RPR.K/D!RPL,.2,2.0,.2)*( R0 I.K)* 17, A
(INM. K)
P IIET=. 5/. 5/. 5/. 8/. 39/. 24/.12/. 05/. 01/9 17.1, T
PIIE - PERCENT INVESTED I H EXPLORAT IO" (FR ACT IO!)
TABIHL - TERtM E D Ni)TNG A TABU LA 1RELAT IOtS 3IP
PII ET - PERCENT INIVESTED I n EXPLORAT IOU TADLE
SPR - RESERVE-PRODU)CT ION R, ATIO (YEARS)
DRPR - ESIRED RESERVE-) PR ODU CTI')E RATIVO (Y EAS)
R() I1 - RETUIRNT ON] I NVESTi•IErT '1UL_T IPLI ER
(DII MESI ONLESS)
INM - I NVESTI:ENT NOI SE iUtI_TI LI E (R I'ENSES I IPLrSS)
As stated by C. Hawkins, the decision to spend money in drilling for
oil or gas is a capital investment decision. ...Capital will be shifted
40) American Petroleum Institute, "Joint Association Survey of Industry
Drilling Costs," and American Gas Association, Gas Facts.
away from exploration if there is the expectation of a higher return in
other investments; the decision to drill for oil or gas is no different
from any other type of investment decision."41
As represented in the model the decision to invest in exploration is
dependent on two factors: 1) A return on investment multiplier that encour-
ages investment when return on investment is adequate and decreases invest-
ment when the return is low. The measure for return on investment is
taken as new contract price/average cost. 2) A function of the reserve-
production ratio RPR which states that when the RPR exceeds a desired
reserve-production ratio (assumed to be 20 years for the gas industry),
investment in discovery will be reduced. This is due to the high inventory
costs of maintaining a reserve larger than needed to ensure the fulfillment
of current contracts. The percent invested in discovery as a function of
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FIGURE 9: PERCENT INVESTED IN EXPLORATION TABLE
41) C.A. Hawkins, "Structure of the Natural Gas Producing Industry,"
Forthcoming in a RFF Volume ed. by Keith Brown, First Draft, (1971), p. 29.
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RPR/DRPR is given in Figure 9. Producers are expected to limit their in-
vestment in discovery to 35 percent when return on investment is normal,
and the reserve-production ratio RPR is about 20 years, for this has been
the normal cost of exploration as a percentage of average revenue. When
reserves become higher than desired, producers will reduce the investment
in exploration to discourage new discoveries. This happened in 1939, for
example, when the percentage invested in discovery fell to about 15 per-
cent4 2 at a high reserve-production ratio RPR of 28 years. If the reserve-
production ratio falls below the desired ratio, producers are assumed to
increase their investment in exploration up to maximum of 50 percent of
sales revenue, if return an investment is normal.
The investment noise multiplier INM allows the analyst to test the
response of the model to random noise fluctuations. The value of the in-
vestment noise multiplier INM is nominally set at 1, and is controlled by
the noise switch SWN.
Return on Investment Multiplier
rO I i. K=TABHIL(RO1 I T, '!CP.K /TC.K', 0,2.2,.2) 18,
ROI IT=I0/.02/.25/.44/.55/.G7/.7./.82/.02 /..2/./1 18.1, T
RO I r - RETURTJ ON I NVESTU!ENT IMULT ILI ER
(D I1 IENrS I ONILESS)
TAMBIL - TERH D)TEOTING A TABUILAPr RELATIO!NSHIP
RO1 IT - RETURN! 01 IrNVESTIIENT fHMULTIPLIER TARl-F,
fN"CP - NEW! CONTRACT PPICE (rOLLARMS/CUJ !C F1OOT)
TC - TOTAL COST (rPOLLARS/C1BDIC F 2OT)
42) Estimated from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Mineral
Industries - 1963, Vol. I, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D.C.,
(1967), p. 13B-67.
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The percentage invested in exploration is also a function of the re-
turn on investment. It is assumed that producers' investment response to
changes in levels of new contract price/total cost is relatively linear
within the normal range of behavior (Figure 10). This has been found to
0P
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FIGURE 10: RETURN ON INVESTMENT MULTIPLIER TABLE
be the case in the Khazzoom study carried out for the FPC.43 When the
ratio of new contract price/total cost becomes very large, however, in-
vestment approaches an upper limit of 50 percent of sales revenue. At
smaller values of new contract price/total cost, investment falls rapidly
to zero.
The effects of the return on investment multiplier seem to be in
evidence today, where costs of exploration are rising faster than the
average price. In the late 60's, according to the gas producers, 44
43) J.D. Khazzoom, Op. Cit. (1971), p. 74-80.
44) Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1971.
_ - 1T·~
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percent invested in exploration had decreased due to decreased return on
investment caused by low prices. Between 1958 and 1968, additions to gas
reserves had been averaging 19 trillion cubic feet annually. But in 1968,
additions to reserves dropped to less than 14 trillion cubic feet, and in
1969, less than 9 trillion cubic feet. Because of the four to five year
delay between investment in exploration and its effects, we should infer
that a drop in investment (here measured by drilling expenditures of gas
wells) occurred around 1963. This seems to be the case, as shown in
Figure 11, for drilling expenditures seem to peak in 1962.
0
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FIGURE 11: DRILLING EXPENDITURES AND DISCOVERIES, 1959-196945
45) American Petroleum Institute, et. al., "Joint Association Survey of
Industry Drilling Costs,"(1960-1967),and American Gas Association, Gas
Facts,(1960-1969),
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Discovery Rate
DR.KL=DELAY3( IE.K/COE.IK, D) 19, R
DD=4.5 19.1, C
DR - DISCOVERY RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
DELAY3 - TERN DENOTING A LAGGED RELATIONS NIP
lIE - INVESTHENT IN EXPLORATION (DOLLARS)
COE - COST OF EXPLORATIONI (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
DD - DISCOVERY DELAY (YEARS)
The outcome of an investment in exploration is generally not known for
four to five years due to the time involved in finding a prospective site
for drilling, setting up and drilling the wells, and making an accurate
estimate of the size of discovery. M.A. Adelman cites, as a rule of thumb,
that four to five years development time is required for wells. 46 Using
lagged regression analyses, J. Daniel Khazzoom has determined the response
of gas discoveries in subsequent years as a function of a one-year impulse
rise in the price of gas. 4 7 The relationship he presents (Figure 12) is
incorporated in the model as a third-order delay with a delay time of 4.5
years.
46) M.A. Adelman, Supply and Price of Natural Gas, p. 6.
47) J.D.-Khazzoom, "FPC Gas Model," Bell Journal of Economics and Manage-
ment Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring, 1971), p. 71,
MODEL 1' - RESPONSE OF GAS DISCOVERIES IN A DISTRICT
TO ONE-YEAR IMPULSE OF 1ý IN THE CEILING PRICE OF GAS
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FIGURE 12: KHAZZOOM MODEL RESPONSE OF DISCOVERIES TO
A ONE-CENT IMPULSE RISE IN PRICE4 8
In the model, the total amount added to reserves per year, the dis-
covery rate DR, is assumed to be a delayed function of investment in
exploration divided by the cost of exploration COE in dollars/ft3 of gas.
The discovery rate thus includes both "new discoveries" and "extensions
and revisions" as distinguished by the American Gas Association. The dis-
covery delay DD is assumed to be 4.5 years.
LOOP 2: DEMAND LOOP
The demand loop (Figure 13) is a negative or goal-seeking loop which
works to establish an equilibrium between discovery rate and usage rate.
48) Ibid., p. 71.
The reserve-production ratio RPR is a measure of the relative levels of
supply (proven reserves PR) and demand (usage rate UR). Producers work to
stabilize this ratio by raising new contract price NCP when reserve-produc-
tion ratio RPR is lower than the desired reserve-production ratio DRPR (and
lowering price when RPR>DRPR) through the price multiplier PM. Consumers
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FIGURE 13: DEMAND LOOP
respond through the demand multiliper DM by reducing consumption at higher
prices, thus lowering the usage rate. This acts to raise the reserve-
production ratio RPR towards the desired level. Note that the level of
average wellhead price which equates discovery and usage is constantly
being driven upward by rising total cost.
b•g RATE
Proven Reserves
PR. [%K=PR. J+ (DT) (DR. dK-LUR. JK) 20, L
PR=PRI 20.1, N
PRI=6.4E12 20.2, C
PR - PROVEN RESElRVES (CUBDIC FEET)
DT - TIMVE I NCREMENT 3ET~IEEN CALCULATIONS (YEARS)
DR - DISCOVERY RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
UR - USAGE RATE (CU51C FEET/YEAR)
PRI - PROVEN' RESERVES INITIAL (CU31C FEET)
Proven reserves PR are increased by the discovery rate DR and de-
creased by the usage rate UR. Proven reserves is a level which corresponds
to the natural gas already discovered by drilling but not yet used. In
most cases it remains in its original reservoir in the ground. For this
reason it is extremely difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of re-
serves discovered when a new field is first drilled, and so each year a
large fraction of discoveries (in most years over half) result from exten-
sions and revisions of already-discovered fields.
Average Usage Rate
AUR. K= SOOTH(UR. JK, AURAD) 21, A
AUR=AURI 21.1, N
AURI=3.2E11 21.2, C
AURAD=1 21.3, C
AUR - AVERAGE USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
SMOOTH - FIRST-ORDER EXPONENTTIIAL SCOOTHIINGO FUNCTIOON
UR - USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
AURAD - AVERAGE USAGE RATE ADJUSTH1ENT DELAY (YEARS)
AURI - AVERAGE USAGE RATE INITIAL (CUDIC FEET/
YEAR)
The average usage rate AUR is represented as an exponential average of
usage rate UR, with a one-year averaging delay. This tends to smooth out
short-term variations in usage, reflecting only the longer-term trends.
This corresponds with industry accounting practices of calculating usage
rates and levels of reserves year by year.
Reserve-Production Ratio
RPR. K=PR. K/AUR. K 22, A
SRPR=20 22.1, C
RPR - RESERVE-PRODUCTIOt! RATIO (YEARS)
PR - PROVEN RESERVES (CU31C FEET)
AU), - AVERAGE USA GE RATE (CU7IC FEFT/YEAfr)
DRPR - DES I RED RESERVE-PRODUCT I ` A II (YCAfS)
The reserve-production ratio RPR has traditionally been the industry's
measure of reserve adequacy. It indicates how long current reserves
would supply current consumption. Usage rate will not remain at current
levels, however. Consumption has been climbing at about seven percent per
year, making the reserve-production ratio a gross overestimate of the
current reserves' actual expected life. Figure 14 shows the relationship
between the reserve-production ratio and actual time before current re-
serves would be depleted at various growth rates for total usage. When
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FIGURE 14: ACTUAL TIME BEFORE DEPLETION AT VARIOUS
GROWTH RATES VERSUS NOMINAL RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO RPR
there is no growth, the relationship is linear,indicating that the time
before depletion is equal to the reserve-production ratio. At seven per-
cent growth, a 20 year reserve-production ratio actually promises to last
only 12.7 years. The reserve-production ratio continues, however, to be
used by producers as a measure of relative abundance of the resource.49
Price Multiplier
PM. K=TAB-IL (PHT, RPR. K/DRPR, 0, 1. ,. 3)*(Pl;. K) 23, A
PMT=8/5. 5/3. 75/2. 35/1. 35/1/1 23.1, T
PH - PRICE MULTIPLIER (r)f'ENSIO'LESS)
TABHL - TERNU DENOTING A TABULAR RELATIOr'SflIP
PMT - PRICE M',ULTIPLIER TABLE
RPR - RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
DRPR - DESIRED RESERVE-PROr)DUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
PNFM - PRICE NOISE HULTIPLIER (r) I DI rESIN!IESS)
The price multiplier (Figure 15) represents the response of the
producers to changes in the reserve-production ratio, and defines the
producer supply curve in the unregulated case. Price never drops below
the cost-plus margin determined by cost of exploration, for it is assumed
producers would never sell below cost. As usage rate or quantity demanded
increases, the reserve-production ratio decreases, and the price at which
producers are willing to sell rises. This is caused by the nature of the
selling process in the industry. Reserves are normally committed to long-
term contracts, in which the producer agrees to deliver a prescribed quan-
tity at a given price for as long as 20 years. Because of the contracts,
a producer runs a certain risk by selling reserves now that he may need to
fulfill contracts in the future. If he does this, and further reduces his
49) Industry practices cited in M.A. Adelman, Op. Cit. (1962), pp. 66-68.
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FIGURE 15: PRICE MULTIPLIER TABLE
reserve-production ratio RPR, he must either discover new reserves to re-
place those sold, or tap more costly known reserves. In either case, the
effect is to cause the producer to sell reserves at a higher price when
reserve-production ratio RPR is low.
The price multiplier PM acts to define the reaction of producers in
setting price to changing conditions to supply and demand. The tradi-
tional approach is to attempt to define a static industry supply and
demand curve, valid at only one point in time. The System Dynamics
approach employed here recognizes the importance of changing economic
conditions when modeling long-term behavior, and thus models the dynamic
responses of producers and consumers to changing conditions of supply and
price. System Dynamics extends the ability of static theory to capture
real-world behavior. Producers react to changing conditions of resource
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availability by charging a higher or lower price. This response affects
the quantity demanded (demand curve) and thus the usage rate. A change
in usage of course changes the conditions of availability. This is a
goal-seeking process which is the dynamic analog of the static concept of
equilibrium. In the real world production and consumption are seldom pre-
cisely balanced, for the equilibrium price is continually changing as
producers' costs change and potential demand rises exponentially. This
focus on actual consumption and discovery, rather than on the abstract
concepts of supply and demand curves, facilitates the evaluation of actual
policies, for actual policies usually have as their objective some change
in actual discovery or consumption.
Demand Multiplier
DM. K=TABHL (DI T, LOGI 0(A•P.K*1E5), 1, %. 5,. 5 )* (!M. K) 24, A
DMT=2.1/1. 5 9 / 1.21/.9/.69/.5/.24/.14/.067/.031/.014/ . I 7 3 1 1 24.1, T
5.5E-3/1.5E-3/2E-4/1.7E-5/0
DI, - DENAND MULTIPLIER (DIMENSIONLESS)
TABHL - TERM DENOTING A TABULAR RELATIOCNS!IIP
DHT - DERAND MULTIPLIER TABLE
LOGN - NATURAL LOGAR I THM IC FUNCT ION
AWP - AVERAGE 'JELLHEA[) PRICE (DOLLARS/CUB'IC FOOT)
DNII - DEMAND NOItSE tMULTIPLIER (DIMENrSIO!LESS)
The demand multiplier (Figure 16) reflects the consumer response in
quantity demanded to changes in price. Data reflecting the demand response
to price are only available in a very small range of price variation.
Since price will undoubtedly rise in the future due to rising costs, no
historical data exists to explain demand behavior at future values of price.
However, the model is sensitive only to the assumption that the response
of consumer demand is negative with respect to price rises, which is cer-
tainly the case. Changes in the individual values on the demand curve do
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FIGURE 16: DEMAND MULTIPLIER TABLE
not affect
effects of
the general behavior modes of the model or the various relative
the policies.
Usage Rate Potential
URP. K=URI *EXP(GC*(T I ME. K-1900) )
GC=. 0657
URI=3.2E11
TIliE= 1900
URP - USAGE RATE POTENITIAL (CUD IC FEET/YEAR)
URI - USAGE RATE INITIAL (CU[31C FEET/YEAR)
EXP - E'XPONENTIAL FUNCTION
GC - GROWITH CONSTANT (FRACTION)
TIME - TIIE (YEARS)
25, A
25.1, C
25.2, C
25.3, 4N
The Potential Usage Rate represents the rate of use of natural gas
each year that consumers would demand, if the price were held constant
and the supply were unlimited. Up to the 1960's the natural gas usage rate
has exhibited an average exponential growth in demand of 6.57 percent per
50) Equation #25 is DYNAMO notation for URP(t) = URI*e (GC1)(t-1900)
51) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1971), p. 97.
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year, while other market forces such as a higher price or restrictions in
supply will eventually limit the growth in actual usage rate. In reality
usage is not free to respond to price changes. However, the delay in
responding to price changes is so short as to be dynamically unimportant
in this study.
Usage Supply Multiplier
USM. K=TABHL(USHT, RPR. IK/D[RPR, 0, 2, . 2) * (UUM. K) 26, A
USMT=O/.12/.7/.86/.95/1/1.02/1.04/1.05/1.06/1.06 26.1, T
USM - USAGE SUPPLY 1MULTIPLIER (DI:MENSIONLESS)
TABHL - TERM DENOTING A TA3ULAR RELATIONSHIP
USMT - USAGE SUPPLY UflLTIPLIER TA3LE
RPR - RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
DRPR - DESIRED RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
UNM - USAGE NOISE IHULTIPLIER (DIMENSIONLESS)
The influence of the usage supply multiplier in the model reflects
the tendency of producers to restrict the sale of reserves under regulation
when relative supply (reserve-production ratio RPR) is low. For example,
the Wall Street Journal (April 12, 1971) reports a waiting list of 17,000
residents of Chicago who have ordered gas but are unable to obtain it.
Producers are reluctant to take on new customers when reserve-production
ratio RPR is low, and will not sell additional gas to existing customers.
The multiplier (Figure 17) is a function of relative coverage of reserves,
or the reserve-production ratio RPR divided by the desired reserve-produc-
tion ratio DRPR. It is assumed that when the reserve-production ratio is
near the desired ratio, producers will not restrict supply,selling as much
as is demanded at the current price. But as reserve-production ratio RPR
drops, suppliers restrict the amount of gas they will sell at the regulated
price, for reasons outlined earlier. E.W. Erickson estimated that in 1967,
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FIGURE 17: USAGE SUPPLY MULTIPLIER TABLE
the production rate was 10 to 25 percent below current demand.52 This
would correspond to the point indicated with an asterisk on Figure 17,
53
since the reserve-production ratio RPR in 1967 was 16 years. The desired
reserve-production ratio DRPR represents simply the average producer's goal
for his reserve-production ratio RPR. That goal certainly can vary from
producer to producer: some are willing to tolerate 18 years, while others
feel safer operating at 25 years. But because the standard contract length
is 20 years, it is assumed in the model that the desired reserve-production
ratio DRPR is 20.
52) E.W. Erickson, "Supply Response in a Regulated Industry:- th.e Case of
Natural Gas," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2,No. 1, (Spring, 1971), p. 120,
53) American Gas Association, Gas Facts, (1969), p. 11.
Usage Rate
UJR. KL=SWI TCII(UUR. K, RUR. K, SW1) 27, R
UR - USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
SW I TCHI - FUNCT I ON WHOSE VALUE IS SET INITI ALLY rBY
ANALYST
UUR - UNREGULATED USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEFT/YEAR)
RUR - REGULATED USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEFT/YEAR)
SW1 - REGULATION SIJITCH
The usage rate UR is controlled by a switch function which permits the
analyst to control whether response of usage rate to supply is through the
usage supply multiplier USM (regulated case, SWl = 1) or through changes in
price P (unregulated case, SWl = 0). In both the unregulated and regulated
cases, producers must respond to changes in supply, represented by the
reserve-production ratio RPR. When the industry is not regulated, pro-
ducers raise price P when reserve-production ratio RPR is low. In the
regulated case, producers cannot raise price, so they restrict the amount
of gas they offer to the market through the usage supply multiplier USM.
The usage rate UR is controlled by the same regulation switch SWl as the
price function.
Unregulated Usage Rate
UUR. K= (URP. K) (DMI. K) 28, A
UUR - UNREGULATED USAGE RATE (C!BIC FEET/YEAR)
UJRP - USAGE RATE POTENTIAL (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
DM - DEMAND MuILTIPLIER (t1riErSI OtLESS)
The unregulated usage rate UUR is equal to the consumer demand for gas
at any given price multiplied by an exponentially increasing function, usage
rate potential URP, growing at 6.57 percent per year. The demand multiplier
DM represents the response of consumers to a change in average wellhead
price, ceteris paribus. It is assumed that this curve is constantly
being shifted due to growth in population and per capita gas consumption.
In the unregulated industry, the unregulated usage rate UUR is equal to
the usage rate UR, and producers respond to changes in relative supply
(reserve-production ratio RPR) through the price multiplier PM.
Regulated Usage Rate
RUR. K=CLI P( (USH. K) (UUR. K), UUR.,, TI ME. K, 1960) 29, A
RUR - REGULATED USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
CLIP - FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE CHANGES DURING RUNI
USM - USAGE SUPPLY MULTIPLIER (DIMIENSIONLESS)
UUR - UNREGULATED USAGE RATE (CU3BIC FEET/YEAR)
TItHE - TIME (YEARS)
When price is regulated, supply and demand are no longer in equilibrium
at the established price. It is no longer true that consumers can buy as
much gas as they would demand at the now regulated average wellhead price
RAWP. Instead, when the average wellhead price AWP is set to be lower than
its equilibrium value, producers will satisfy only a fraction of the poten-
tial demand. The fraction actually supplied will depend on their relative
coverage, or reserve-production ratio RPR/desired reserve-production ratio
DRPR, through the usage supply multiplier USM. In the case of the natural
gas industry, regulation had little effect on the average wellhead price
AWP until 1960, although the Supreme Court decision took place in 1954.
Thus the regulated usage rate UREG is expressed through a switching function,
activated in 1960, whose value is equal to unregulated usage rate UUR before
1960, and unregulated usage rate UUR multiplied by the usage supply multi-
plier USM after 1960.
CHAPTER IV
INCORPORATION OF EMPIRICAL DATA
The preceding chapter has presented a theoretical model of the U.S.
natural gas industry derived from a survey of empirical literature and
conversations with industry policy makers. The model does not contain
elaborate detail, but is an approximation of the real world composed of
those relationships necessary and just sufficient to explain the major
determinants of long-term discovery and sales. Chapter III gave a verbal
description and defense of the assumed system structure, and illustrated
the shape of the nonlinear relationships or table functions in the model.
In this chapter statistical inference techniques are employed to incor-
porated empirical data into the model. The first section examines the
applicability of statistical techniques to System Dynamics models. The
second section describes the parameterization of the natural gas model.
The third section examines the behavior of the model compared to real-
world time series to provide some measure of model validity.
The Use of Linear Statistical Methods for
Parameter Estimation in System Dynamics Models
System Dynamics is a technique of modeling which has been specifically
developed for analysis of nonlinear, multi-feedback loop systems too complex
for the derivation of general analytical solutions. Most System Dynamics
models adopt a long time horizon which generally means that one or more
variables will be related nonlinearly over their range of behavior. It is
these nonlinear relationships (generally expressed as table functions in
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System Dynamics models) which are the most difficult to estimate, for they
represent a time-independent theory of a relationship between variables
which often must be extracted from time-dependent data. Yet it is the
nonlinear hypotheses which are most in need of empirical data, for they
are extremely difficult to estimate without some empirical basis. This
chapter will therefore focus on the estimation of nonlinear relationships
or table functions using linear, statistical techniques. Problems arising
due to nonlinearities and feedback-loop structures will be addressed
separately.
Nonlinearities
To use linear statistical methods in estimating nonlinear table func-
tions in System Dynamics models, it is first necessary to transform the
hypothesized relationships into a linear form. Often it is possible to
approximate the nonlinear relationship as linear in a specific range of
available data. When this is an unreasonable approximation to make, there
exists a number of useful transformations which convert nonlinear rela-
tionships into linear form, thus extending the applicability of linear
regression techniques.54 When such a transformation is possible, the re-
lationship transformed is termed intrinsically linear.
Linear regression analysis is therefore applicable only for linear or
intrinsically linear systems. When making linear assumptions about non-
linear relationships in System Dynamics models, two problems may occur.
First, many nonlinear forms exist which cannot be linearized, and are
54) See, for example, Draper and Smith, Applied Regression Analysis,
John Wiley & Sons, New York, (1966), p. 131,
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not intrinsically linear. Second, when one makes a linear assumption about
a relationship in a certain region of variation of the variables, it is
important to realize that the variance of the estimation increases propor-
tionately with the square of the distance from the mean of the data. This
implies that extrapolation of the relationship outside the range of behav-
ior can be extremely inaccurate.
Feedback-Loop Structure
The feedback loop structure of System Dynamics models provides their
most limiting characteristic in any attempt to employ linear statistical
methods for estimation. The existence of a feedback loop implies that two
or more variables are interdependent--that, for instance, Y depends on X
and X depends on Y. This implies that the system can be represented econo-
metrically by a set of simultaneous equations.
When simultaneity exists, the literature on regression analysis55
warns that the use of Ordinary Least Squares regression techniques can give
biased estimates of the regression coefficients. This means that the rela-
tionship between two variables as inferred from time series data by OLS
regression is different from the actual time-independent relationship which
exists in the real world. Since we are after the real-world relationship
and not simply that inferred through time series data, we must be wary of
OLS regression results in feedback-loop systems.
What can be done to recover the real-world relationships when normal
regression techniques yield biased results? Johnston [Johnston (1963)]
55) See, for example, J. Johnston, Op. Cit. (1963), p. 233.
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proposes more sophisticated methods of regression analysis aimed at purging
the regression coefficients of bias due to simultaneous equations--Indirect
Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) are two of the most fre-
quently used techniques. These techniques can only be used in certain
equation systems, however. The condition under which any advanced regres-
sion can be used to analyze a specific equation is called the identifica-
tion condition.56 The conditions of identification relate the number of
exogenous and endogenous variables included in an equation. An equation
is said to be exactly identified if the number of exogenous variables
excluded from the individual equation is equal to the number of endogenous
variables included less one. An equation is overidentified if the number
of excluded exogenous variables is greater than the number of included
endogenous variables less one, and underidentified if the opposite is true.
Indirect Least Squares can only be used for exactly identified relations,
and Two-Stage Least Squares for either overidentified or exactly identi-
fied relationships.
What are the implications of the identification condition in attempt-
ing to use statistical methods in System Dynamics models? Roughly, the
conditions of identifiability state that the more exogenous variables a
system has, the more likely that the system is exactly or over-identified,
thus allowing one to use advanced regression techniques. However, the
long time horizons of most System Dynamics models tends to reduce the num-
ber of variables which can be considered exogenous. It is generally true
therefore that many of the relationships in System Dynamics models will be
56) See F.M.--Fisher, The Identification Problem in Econometrics, McGraw-
Hill Book Co., N.Y., (1966).
underidentified and thus, strictly speaking, not susceptable to the more
advanced techniques of recovery from bias due to simultaneous equations.
This last statement must be qualified, however, because the issue of
identifiability should not be viewed as a dichotomous situation. To quote
F.M. Fisher, "it is quite possible to define a concept of 'near identifia-
bility'". 57 In terms of System Dynamics models, a relationship which is
strictly underidentified can be forced to be identified if some endogenous
variables are assumed exogenous. For example, most econometricians assume
any delayed or lagged endogenous variable an exogenous variable. Fisher
warns that this practice is a dangerous one if used as a rule-of-thumb
procedure to escape the identification problem, for it can still lead to
biased regression coefficients.58 Yet in many cases it is possible to as-
sume that in the short term, certain variables are exogenous in estimating
relationships in System Dynamics models, and to obtain a reasonable estimate
from the process. It is important, however, to recognize the assumptions
one makes in obtaining those estimates, and their possible consequences on
the validity of the regression coefficient.
How is it possible to determine the reasonableness of the assumption
that a specific variable or set of variables is exogenous? An important
objective is to measure the bias which one introduces in assuming that cer-
tain endogenous variables are exogenous. The bias can be approximated by
simulation of System Dynamics models. One can hypothesize or measure by
regression on time series data the relationship which would occur if the
57) F.M. Fisher, "Simultaneous Equations Estimation - The State of the Art,"
IDA Economic Papers (July, 1970), IDA, 400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Va.
22202, -p. 41.
58) Ibid., p. 76.
variables could be considered exogenous. The appropriate model equations
are then altered to reflect this relationship, and the model is simulated
to create time series data over the same period as the real-world data.
The difference between the coefficients inferred statistically from simu-
lation time series (where no endogenous variables are assumed exogenous)
and that from real-world time series gives a measure of the bias due to the
assumption that the variables are exogenous.59
This method is similar to the econometric technique known as synthetic
data analysis, where in place of the System Dynamics model one uses a set
of simultaneous equations to estimate the bias. 6 0 Thus, simulation gives
us a method to check the validity of assumptions made when applying linear
regression techniques to System Dynamics models. This estimation procedure
was applied to the table functions of the natural gas model, and the re-
sults are described in the following section.
Parameterization of the Natural Gas Model
The preceding section described a procedure for incorporation of
empirical data into System Dynamics table functions. This procedure can
be outlined as follows:
1. Test identification of relationship (difference between
the number of exogenous variables excluded to the number
of endogenous variables included in the equation). If
exactly or over-identified, proceed to regression.
59) This measure is in reality only an approximation of the bias, for it
assumes all other relationships and the structure of the simulation model
are correct.
60) See, for example, J. Johnston, Op. Cit. (1960), pp. 275-295.
2. If relationship is underidentified, assume some variables
exogenous, and proceed to regression.61
3. Incorporate regression results in table function coefficients.
4. Test for bias due to simultaneous equations by creating time
series data with the model, and performing the same regression
on the model data as performed in step 2.
If the results of the regression on synthetic data are the same as those
obtained from real-world data, then the assumption that some variables
are exogenous did not necessarily add significant bias to the results.
If the two regression results are different, then different variables must
be assumed exogenous, and the estimating procedure repeated. It may be
impossible, however, to obtain an unbiased estimate from real-world data.
In that case, one can use trial and error simulation to obtain the table
function which best recreates time series data (without, however, obtain-
ing any quantitative measure of confidence in the results). The following
section describes the estimation of the six table functions in the model,
following the procedure outlined above. The tests for bias were performed
by creating time series from the model run with a normally distributed
random error added to cost of exploration COE, percent invested in explor-
ation PIIE, price multiplier PM, demand multiplier DM, and usage supply
multiplier USM. This test checks the stability of the relationships in.
the presence of noise in the system, and provides a measure of bias when
one compares the actual relationship in the model to the relationship
obtained by OLS regression on the synthetic data. The noise-generating
61) See [Fisher (1970)] for a discussion of the choice of exogenous or
"instrumental" variables.
function is assumed multiplicative, and takes the form:
X.K = SAMPLE (NORMRN(MEAN, DEV), SMPLI, INVAL)
where SAMPLE is a sample-and-hold function with initial value INVAL,
sample interval SMPLI, and value NORMRN. NORMRN generates random numbers
normally distributed with mean MEAN and standard deviation DEV.
Cost of Exploration
Real data on the cost of exploration is not generally available, but
can be derived from available data on investment in exploration and on
gas discovery rate. The following approximate relationship was used to
generate the data:
COEt IIEt
DRt+5
The function is approximate because the lagged five-year delay is really
a third-order delay with average delay time equal to 4.5 years. The cost
of exploration is assumed in the model to be a function of the fraction
of unproven reserves remaining FURR. The initial amount of unproven re-
serves UPRI is assumed to be 1,040 X 1012 ft3 of gas for the continental
U.S., so data on the fraction of unproven reserves can be derived from
the formula: t
UPRI - ( DR )
FURR =
t UPRI
The derivation of cost of exploration data can be found in Appendix II.
The nonlinear relationship for cost of exploration assumed in Chapter III
can be approximated as:
COEt =P (FURRt)Pl (9)
which transforms to the linear relationship:
In (COEt) =o +Pl ln (FURRt)+ *t
This equation is exactly identified. This implies that advanced
statistical techniques could be used to estimate the relationship, but
as a first approximation in each table function, it is useful to test
the validity of Ordinary Least Squares. This would involve the assumption
that the fraction of unproven reserves remaining is exogenous. The re-
sulting OLS regression gives:
In (COEt) = 3.9 - 1.6 In (10 * FURRt) 6 2
(.96) (.52)
R2 = 51 SER = 0.26
The results are significant at the 5 percent level (Fq = 9.35). Both to
and f1 are significant at the 1 percent level. Most of the observed
variance is due to earlier values of cost of exploration COE, which aren't
as reliable as current data because the industry only began accurate re-
porting of cost in 1959.
When the above function derived from historical data is entered into
the model as the cost of exploration table function COET, the average of three
regressions on synthetic data created by the model for the same time per-
iod is:
In (COEt) = 3.73 - 1.53 In (10 * FURRt)
Details on the synthetic data analyses are given in Appendix III.
Figure 18 gives a graphic comparison of the results of the synthetic
data analysis performed on the cost of exploration table COET. The solid
line is a linear approximation of the relationship obtained from OLS
regression on historical data, and is the relationship assumed in the
62) In cases where variables range below one, it is best to multiply the
data by 10 to avoid the behavior of the log function in that region. This
transformation does not affect the coefficients--only the constant term.
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FIGURE 18: RESULTS OF SYNTHETIC DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COST OF
EXPLORATION TABLE COET
model over the range of FURR from .5 to .8. The dotted line represents
the average of regressions on three sets of synthetic data, the results
of which are reported in Appendix III. The synthetic data regressions
seem to converge satisfactorily on the model relationship, giving evidence
that the assumption that the fraction of unproven reserves remaining FURR
is exogenous adds little bias to the relationship.
Price Multiplier
The price multiplier table PMT relates the ratio of new contract price
NCP divided by total cost TC to the reserve-production ratio RPR:
NCPt
PMt =- TCt - f(RPRt )
This relationship is valid only until regulation occurs. After
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regulation is enforced, the price margin is exogenously determined by the
FPC, and is no longer free to be set by producers in response to relative
supply. Since no reliable data could be obtained for new contract price
NCP before regulation, the analysis was carried out using average wellhead
price AWP. When using average wellhead price AWP, the relevant total cost
is that which occurred approximately ten years ago, TCt_-1063 The equation
expressing the general form of the relationship hypothesized for the price
multiplier PM is:
In (AWPt/COEt •o = 1 + 1 n (RPRt)+ +
This equation is underidentified, for all three variables included
in the equation are endogenous, and the system contains only one exogenous
variable. In order to perform an OLS regression, cost of exploration
COEt-10 and reserve-production ratio RPR must be assumed exogenous. No
time series data on cost of exploration exist for the 1950's, the period
before regulation. Yet a regression can be done using the predicted value
of cost of exploration COE from simulated time series. This procedure is
similar to Two-Stage Least Squares, where one uses predicted values of
endogenous variables to purge the equation of simultaneity bias. The
assumption that the reserve-production ratio RPR is exogenous may introduce
bias--this can be tested by synthetic data analysis.
The historical data on the price multiplier PM is given in Appendix II.
Arguments advanced in Chapter III implied that producers will charge an
average wellhead price equal to smoothed total cost (TCt_10) if the
reserve-production ratio is large. Thus the price multiplier should
63) This delay can be approximated by Proven Reserves/(Discovery Rate +
Usage Rate). From 1950-1960, PR=24, DR=15, UR=9. Therefore delay = 10
years.
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approach 1.0 as the reserve-production ratio rises above the desired level
of twenty years. This theory is well supported by the data--Figure 19
shows a plot of in (AWPt/COEt- 10) versus In (RPRt /10).
A regression on historical data gives highly significant results--the
regression is significant at the 1 percent level. It can be seen from
Assumed Relationship in Model
w' In(PMt)=1.9-1.8*ln(RPRt /10)
Regression on Historical Data
i ln(PMt)=1.39-1.25*ln(RPRt /10)
t t
Data (1949-1959) . x
1.2.8 .9 1.0
n (RPRt /10)
FIGURE 19: DATA AND REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PRICE MULTIPLIER
TABLE (log-linear scale)
Figure 19 that the data do not conform well to a long-linear hypothesis
over their entire range. A better fit to data is obtained by breaking
the data into two parts: above a reserve-production ratio of 24 years
[ln (RPR/10) = .9], the model relationship approaches 1.0 asymptotically.
Below this point, historical data leads to the relationship:
0
U
H
*1-
In (PMt) = 1.92 - 1.82 In (RPRt/10)
(.142) (.168)
R2 = .97 SER = .0138
The relationship indicated by the solid line in Figure 18 was incorporated
in the price multiplier table function PMT.
When the model is used to create synthetic time series data from
1949-1959, reserve-production ratio stays relatively constant around
twenty years, while the real-world data decreases from thirty-three to
twenty years. This is due to the fact that the model assumes investment
in exploration IIE will decrease if reserve-production ratio RPP e-xceeds
the desired value DRPR, while in actuality this was not the case through
1950. Much of the gas found from 1900-1950 was found while looking for
oil, and thus the actual investment in exploration for gas was higher
than planned, if one allocates investment according to the resource found
(gas or oil). The model assumes investment in gas can be made idependently
from oil, and so the normal mode of industry behavior is to hold reserve-
production ratio RPR constant near twenty years. For reasons stated earlier,
this assumption is becoming more valid as firms explore and drill selec-
tively for gas.
This discrepancy makes it difficult to measure the bias due to the
assumption that cost of exploration and reserve-production ratio are
exogenous. Instead of using data from the period 1959-1969, a later
period was chosen where the reserve-production ratio RPR did vary in the
simulation run (see Appendix III). Figure 20 shows the results of the
synthetic data analysis performed on the price multiplier table PMT.
The solid line is the linear approximation of the relationship from Figure
19 contained in the model. The dotted line is the average of three regre-
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FIGURE 20: RESULTS OF SYNTHETIC DATA
ANALYSIS OF THE PRICE MULTIPLIER TABLE PMT
ssion on synthetic data which clearly converges on the relationship assumed
in the model. This implies that the OLS assumptions of exogenous variables
did not significantly bias the estimate.
Demand Multiplier
The unregulated usage rate UUR is a function of average wellhead
price AWP and an exogenous function of time which represents exponential
increases in population and per-capita demand for gas. The regression
equation is then:
In (UURt) =Po +) 1 ln (AWPt) +#2(t)+ t
This equation is underidentified, for it includes two endogenous variables
and no exogenous variables are excluded. The simplest procedure is again
Ordinary Least Square--average wellhead price AWP is assumed exogenous.
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The regression was performed on 1945-1959 data for average wellhead
price AWP and usage rate UR, presented in Appendix II. The regression
yielded:
In (UURt ) = 2.46 - (.556) In (AWPt) + (.11) t
(.275) (.143) (.0074)
R2 = .99 SER = .044
This regression yielded highly significant results (F2  = 507). The
exponential growth factor is higher than the average with no price effects
(11 percent versus 7 percent),because the reaction of consumer demand to
a rising price tends to decrease the observed growth in consumption. The
2.0
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A
Relationship Obtained from Regression
on Historical Data
ln(DMt)=1.28-0.556*1n(AWPt)
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FIGURE 21: DEMAND MULTIPLIER TABLE DMT AND HISTORICAL DATA
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price coefficient is negative and relatively inelastic, which is to be
expected when prices are so low. The demand multiplier table DMT was
obtained from the above relationship by normalizing its value to 1.0 at
an average wellhead price AWP of 10¢/Mcf. The relative position of the
curve can then be changed by varying the initial value of usage rate URI.
The relationship between demand and price resulting from this regression
is shown in Figure 21. The data plotted were obtained using an 11 percent
growth in potential usage rate. In running the model, however, a 7
percent rate was used in order to be conservative about future growth in
usage. The sensitivity of the model to growth in potential usage rate is
tested in Chapter V.
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FIGURE 22: RESULTS OF SYNTHETIC DATA ANALYSIS ON THE
DEMAND MULTIPLIER TABLE DMT
In order to test for bias, the model was run with stochastic noise
elements, and synthetic data from 1945-1959 was obtained. When regressions
are run on the synthetic data, the resulting relationship converges on the
assumed demand multiplier relationship DMT during that period (Figure 22)
indicating little bias due to OLS assumptions.
It is important to note how limited this information acquired from
time series data really is. Price of gas is continually rising, and this
guarantees that future behavior will be outside the range of available
data. The behavior of the demand multiplier at higher prices is a hypo-
thesis about future consumer tastes-it is assumed in the model that demand
becomes more elastic as price rises. Although this hypothesis is critical
in pinpointing future values of usage rate or proven reserves, the exact
determination of the demand multiplier DM does not affect the relative
effects of policies on the behavior modes of the system.
Usage Supply Multiplier
The usage supply multiplier USM incorporates into the model the mechan-
ism by which producers ration the dwindling supplies of gas when price is
regulated. When there is a free market, producers raise the new contract
price of gas in response to shortages (measured by reserve-production ratio
RPR). With regulation, producers must respond by limiting the quantity
of gas sold. The usage supply multiplier thus restricts usage rate as the
reserve-production ratio drops below the desired ratio, twenty years.
Data for the usage supply multiplier are derived in Appendix II. To
obtain an estimate of this effect, it was assumed that price is held con-
stant from 1960 - 1970, and potential usage rate rises at 6.6 percent per
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year. An Ordinary Least Squares Regression can be performed if the reserve-
production ratio RPR is assumed exogenous. The results are:
In (USMt) = - 0.653 + 0.213 In (RPRt)
(.107) (.038)
R2 = .78 SER = .020
The relationship is significant at the 1 percent level (F9 = 32).
When a synthetic data analysis is performed on the usage supply multiplier
table USMT, there appears to be an upward bias on the values of the usage
supply multiplier at lower values of the reserve-production ratio RPR
(Figure 23; RPR = 12-14 years). In order to correct for this, the model
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relationship (solid line) was adjusted downward in that region of reserve-
production ratio RPR. With the assumed model relationship, regressions on
three sets of synthetic data yield the relationship:
In (USMt) = - 0.682 + 0.226 In (RPRt)
which is very close to that obtained from historical data, indicating the
existing bias has been taken into account in the assumed model relationship.
Thus the assumed model relationship is a closer approximation to the real-
world relationship than that observed from historical data.
Percent Invested in Exploration
The amount of investment in exploration in any given year is defined
to be the sales revenue SR for that year multiplied by the percent invested
in exploration PIIE. Percent invested in exploration is assumed to be a
function of return on investment (measured by the ratio of new contract
price to total cost NCP/TC) and relative supply (measured by the reserve-
production ratio RPR).
This formulation will recreate time series data only in a period where
there is little interaction between exploration in the gas and the oil
industries. Carryover effects, chance discoveries of gas when searching
for oil, have been small since the 1950's, so the data used for estimation
of the percent invested in exploration function PIIE are taken from the
period 1955-1967 (see Appendix II).
A regression equation in the form of the hypothesized relationship
between percent invested in exploration PIIE, reserve-production ratio RPR,
and return on investment (measured by new contract price to total cost
NCP/TC) is given by:
In (PIIE ) =? + 1 ln (RPRt) 2 in (NCPt/TCt) + t
This relationship is underidentified, for it includes four endogenous
variables and excludes only one exogenous variable, potential usage rate
URP. The first approximation tested was the assumption that reserver-
production ratio RPR and new contract price over total cost NCP/TC are
exogenous. With that assumption, Ordinary Least Squares is appropriate.
The OLS analysis was performed, and the regression gave results
significant at the 5 percent level (F8 = 5.07). Further analysis of the
regression reveals a number of problems, however. The coefficient of
new contract price over total cost NCP/TC is negative and not significantly
different from zero, and the coefficient of the reserve-production ratio
RPR is positive. The latter result would imply that as reserve-production
ratio declines, producers would tend to decrease their investment in ex-
ploration, given a constant return on investment. The regression results
are as foll-ows;
In (10 * PIIEt ) = -(2.21) + (1.14) In (RPRt) -(.022) In (10 * NCPt/TCt )
(1.49) (.73) (.346)
R2 = .56 SER = .14
An examination of the variance-covariance matrix shows that the two
independent variables, reserve-production ratio RPR and new contract price
over total cost NCP/TC, are highly correlated (correlation coefficient =
.89). This implies that the variables are in fact not independent of each
other. This is not surprising, given the circumstances of the period
1955-1967. In that period, both reserve-production ratio RPR and the ratio
or new contract price to total cost NCP/TC decrease due to rising usage
rate. Usage rate decreases reserve-production ratio directly, and decreases
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the ratio of new contract price to total cost by increasing sales revenue,
which stimulates discoveries, and causes total cost to rise due to rising
cost of exploration. Thus one can expect the reserve-production ratio RPR
to be correlated with new contract price over total cost NCP/TC, as is
shown in Figure 24.
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FIGURE 24: CORRELATION OF NEW CONTRACT PRICE/TOTAL COST
WITH RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO RPR, 1955-1967
A second regression on historical data using two less data points
reveals the effects of multicollinearity on OLS regressions. The second
regression is still significant, yet both coefficients have changed drast-
ically - the coefficient of reserve-production ratio RPR is now negative
and about three times as large, and the coefficient of new contract price
to total cost NCP/TC is positive, significant, and two orders of magnitude
larger than before. The results of the second regression are as follows:
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(2.46) (1.35) (0.66)
R = .78 SER = .093
This phenomenon is not unusual for regressions whose independent variables
are highly collinear - the coefficients become highly unstable, making it
impossible to determine the real-world relationship from OLS. This second
regression reveals a second problem: the Durbin-Watson statistic is 3.2,
indicating autocorrelation, a symptom of bias due to simultaneous equations.
It isclear that Ordinary Least Squares gives unsatisfactory estimates
for the relationship determining percent invested in exploration PIIE.
Conceivably it may be possible to make other less naive assumptions of
exogenous variables, and perform a more sophisticated analysis using Two-
Stage Least Squares, or some other higher-order regression technique.
Instead of this approach, the relationship was estimated using simulation.
The two table functions were hypothesized from the information presented
in Chapter III, and then the model was used to create synthetic time series
data corresponding to the same period as the real-world data, 1955-1967.
By iterative changes in the two table functions, the synthetic data created
by the model can be made to fit real-world time series data as shown in
Figure 25. The final table functions are defined in Chapter III.
The fit to data relating percent invested in exploration PIIE to new
contract price over total cost NCP/TC shown in Figure 25a is quite satis-
factory. The fit of data relating percent invested in exploration PIIE to
reserve-production ratio RPR seems to be shifted to the left (Figure 25b).
This can be explained by the fact that the model does not include carry-
over effects between the oil and the gas industry. Those effects caused
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FIGURE 25: REAL-WORLD AND MODEL-GENERATED DATA RELATING
PERCENT INVESTED IN EXPLORATION PIIE, NEW CONTRACT
PRICE/TOTAL COST NCP/TC, AND RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO RPR
the reserve-production ratio RPR to be high before 1950. Although the
model data and real-world data converge at lower values of reserve-produc-
tion ratio RPR, earlier values of reserve-production ratio RPR from model
data are lower than real-world data, for the model tends to stabilize re-
serve-production ratio RPR at twenty years.
An examination of the results of OLS regressions performed on synthe-
tic data gives further support for the hypothesized relationships. A re-
gression on time series created by the model without noise inputs (data
graphed in Figure 25) reveals substantial bias due to the feedback effects
of the system-- the regression on synthetic data shows a positive rela-
tionship between investment and reserve-production ratio RPR, while the
underlying relationship assumed in the model is negative:
In (10 * PIIEt ) = - 0.791 + 0.558 In (RPRt) + 0.169 In (10 * NCPt/TCt)
(.223) (.131) (.064)
R2 = .99 SER = .01
One cause of this phenomenon is the feedback between percent invested
in exploration PIIE and reserve-production ratio RPR--as investment goes
down, discoveries decrease, lowering the reserve-production ratio RPR.
Another contributor to this effect is the exponentially increasing usage
rate UR, which tends to decrease the reserve-production ratio RPR exo-
genously during this period when investment is also decreasing.
A series of regressions on data created by the model with stochastic
components in the five system equations reveals the effects of multi-
collinearity--the values of the regression coefficients from synthetic
data become very unstable, as is the case with real-world data (Appendix
III). The correlation coefficient between reserve-production ratio RPR
and new contract price over total cost NCP/TC is .88, as compared to the
real-world data coefficient of .89. The evidence supplied by simulation
analysis thus supports the formulation of the investment function present-
ed in Chapter III.
Comparison of Model Behavior with Historical Data
Figures 26 and 27 compare real-world time series data to model-gener-
ated data for the period 1930 to 1970, a period where data are available
on most of the model variables. The model shows excellent agreement with
time series data for unproven reserves UPR, usage rate UR, and cost of
exploration COE. Discovery rate data is extremely noisy, but converges
well with model-generated data when smoothed. Discrepancies in proven
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reserves, price, and reserve-production ratio RPR arise again due to
carryover effects from oil exploration. As gas was discovered while
searching for oil, proven reserves PR were increased beyond the normal
values generated by the model. This increases reserve-production ratio
RPR in this period, which decreases average wellhead price AWP and new
contract price NCP as well.
It can be seen that the model recreates phasing effects very well,
however. Discovery rate DR drops below usage rate UR in 1966-1967
in both model and real-world data, causing proven reserves PR to peak in
1967. If one smooths the discovery rate DR data, it appears discovery
rate DR peaks around 1960, as the model shows. While demonstrated abi-
lity to reproduce past behavior is no guarantee of a model's utility in
projecting the impact of future changes in the system it represents, the
fidelity of the model's phasing and turning points is a strong indicator
of the model's utility.
Implications of Statistical Data Analysis for System Dynamics Studies
The model of the U.S. natural gas industry was first constructed and
simulated extensively without a formal statistical analysis of the rela-
tionships expressed by the six table functions. These relationships were
hypothesized to be consistent with an intuitive impression of the industry
formed from extensive research of the literature on U.S. natural gas.
Because the formal analysis described in this chapter involved an addi-
tional amount of effort comparable to the initial formulation of the
model, it is appropriate to ask how much was gained through the additional
investment in time.
A qualitative answer to this question can be obtained by comparing
extended simulations of the model with and without the refined tabular
relationships, and both with and without policy changes. Given the role of
such a model in policy analysis it is the change in the relative impact of
a policy, not changes in the absolute value of a model parameter at some
point in the future, which is the measure of increased utility. The
model is not appropriately used for point predictions, but rather for
the selection of the best policy given some goal. If the relative desir-
ability of two policies were preserved by refining the model, that would
constitute a significant increase in model utility due to statistical
analysis.
Figure 28 and 29 show the relative effects of regulation on the long-
term behavior of the industry before (Figure 28) and after (Figure 29)
the preceding analysis of historical data was performed. One can say
generally that the relative impact of regulation on the two models is the
same. In both cases, regulation holds the price down, causing discovery
rate DR to peak earlier, and usage rate UR to rise further due to in-
creased demand. In both cases, proven reserves PR is greatly depressed
in the long run with regulation. For a further comparison of policy ef-
fects before and after statistical analysis, refer to Chapter V and
[Naill (1972)].
Although the overall behavior modes and policy response of the model
are essentially unchanged with the additional statistical analysis, it is
important to note that the fit of the model to existing historical data is
considerably improved by the additional effort. The relative importance
of the contributions of a structurally oriented modeling effort or one
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with more emphasis on historical data depends on the purpose of the model.
Models are generally used for either the prediction of future values of
variables, or as a tool to test the relative effects of various policies.
System Dynamics models are generally employed in the analysis of
problems where the available data are incomplete and often inaccurate,
and where one is interested in the behavior of the system beyond some
turning point or after the introduction of a substantial change. Then
point prediction is not a valid use of the model.64
It is generally true for systems which contain many negative feed-
back relationships that the behavior modes of the system are insensitive
to the exact shape of the individual table functions, but rather are
determined by the overall causal structure and delays in the system.
This is fortunate, for one can expect the individual coefficients of a
real system to change slowly over time--the general causal structure in
a socio-economic system is, however, much more enduring.
Fitting historical data very precisely to an invalid system struc-
ture will produce little of use in long-term policy analysis. However,
once the structure is determined, detailed analysis of data can serve to
verify hypothesized relationships in the system, and to derive better
estimates of the nonlinear relationships and individual coefficients in
the system.
64) For an example of a System Dynamics-econometric study where this is
not the case, see [Weymar (1969)].
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CHAPTER V
DESCRIPTION OF MODEL BEHAVIOR AND EVALUATION OF POLICIES
This chapter describes general model behavior and the response of
the model to various sensitivity tests and policy changes. The model is
first run without any policy changes, representing the behavior of the
industry if no regulation had occurred. Next, the effects of regulation
on long-term behavior of the industry are evaluated. This represents a
baseline run of existing policy, to which several additional possible
policies are compared.
General Model Behavior: The Unregulated Industry
Figure 30 shows the behavior of the model of the U.S. natural gas
industry under conditions of no regulation. Discovery rate DR and usage
rate UR rise freely until 1972, for exploration costs COE are low and
rising only very gradually, and proven reserves PR are initially high
with respect to usage rate UR. When the fraction of unproven reserves
remaining FURR drops to about .4, costs begin to rise more quickly (Figure
3), causing average wellhead price AWP to rise. Because of the delay in
the response of average wellhead price AWP to total cost TC, the cost of
additional discovery rises faster than price and revenues, forcing dis-
coveries to begin declining in 1975.
The rising average wellhead price AWP slows the exponentially rising
usage rate UR through reduced demand (demand multiplier DM, Figure 16),
and eventually causes it to drop in 1978. Proven reserves PR reach a
peak of about 360 trillion cubic feet in 1978, and begin to decrease as
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discovery rate DR falls below usage rate UR. As the fraction of unproven
reserves remaining FURR drops to about .3, costs are rising so fast that
the return on investment on new discoveries becomes unattractive, and the
return on investment multiplier ROIM forces the percent invested in explor-
ation PIIE to drop almost to zero in 1990. Discoveries thus also drop
almost to zero, causing about one-twentieth of the initial unproven re-
serves to remain undiscovered, for the cost of this last amount's discov-
ery is so high that it is not worth finding. Concurrently, the reserve-
production ratio RPR has begun to rise due to high proven reserves PR and
low usage rate UR, causing the total cost smoothing delay to increase,
and slow the rise in average wellhead price AWP (reflecting the smoothed
total cost of proven reserves). This causes usage rate UR to decay more
slowly from 1985 on, and the accumulated proven reserves PR decline slowly
over time. By 2050, almost one-tenth of the total initial U.S. supply of
gas remains in proven reserves, for its high price has discouraged demand.
It is reasonable to expect that conditions like those after year 1990
would stimulate government intervention in ways that could alter several
assumptions underlying the model. Nevertheless, reserves remaining at that
point are so low that no significant change in the total life cycle is any
longer possible beyond 1990. One also could speculate what role reserve-
production ratio RPR would play at the extreme end of the life cycle.
Desired reserve-production ratio RPR would probably increase when depletion
is imminent.
These possibilities lead one to recognize the difference between using
a model to predict what will happen and using it to show the logical out-
come of current policies. This study has the second objective.
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System Behavior Under Regulation
Figure 31 shows the effects of ceiling-price regulation based on
cost plus a margin, as described in Chapter III. This corresponds to the
actions taken by the FPC after the 1954 Supreme Court Decision on the
Phillips case.65 The behavior of the model is identical to the unregu-
lated case up to 1954, with both discovery rate DR and usage rate UR
exhibiting exponential growth at about 7 percent per year, keeping up
with potential demand. After 1954, however, the effects of the Phillips
decision cause new contract price NCP to fall, and average wellhead price
AWP to remain constant at its 1960 level. The regulated level of new
contract price NCP is lower than the gas companies would charge without
regulation. Thus investment in discovery is depressed almost immediately
through the return on investment multiplier. This causes discovery rate
DR to slow its growth and finally peak in 1960 at a level well below the
unregulated case. The lower average wellhead price AWP has encouraged
usage rate UR to grow faster than in the unregulated case through stimu-
lated demand, causing the reserve-production ratio RPR to fall dramati-
cally during the 1960's.
Because of heavy industry pressure and clearly rising costs of explo-
ration, the ceiling price rises in the mid-1970's, but not to the price
level of the unregulated run. This stimulates some additional discovery
through 1990 due to higher return on investment, but not enough to in-
crease the reserve-production ratio RPR, which continues to fall due to
higher usage rate. Proven reserves, meanwhile, have peaked in 1967 at a
lower level than in the unregulated case (about 250 trillion cubic feet
65) R. S. Spritzer, Op. Cit. (1971), p. 10-12.
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as compared to 360 trillion cubic feet). Proven reserves also drop faster
than in the unregulated case, for usage rate is higher due to the lower
average wellhead price. Thus by 2050 proven reserves have fallen to one-
fifth of their value in the unregulated run, or about 15 trillion cubic
feet.
The overall effect of regulation on the behavior of the model is to
transfer usage away from the future, increasing the satisfaction of pre-
sent needs, while decreasing the reserves available for the future. Under
regulation, the industry is left in the year 2000 with few reserves left
to discover, and few reserves left to use--the domestic supply of natural
gas has essentially been depleted. This is in contrast to the unregulated
case, where although the discovery activity is completed earlier (stimu-
lated by higher prices), proven reserves remain high, allowing the usage
rate to continue higher after the year 2000. It need hardly be mentioned
that the conversion of coal into synthetic gas reserve may be a major
source of natural gas by the year 2000. It is not the objective of this
model to study that influence. However, this model would be an extremely
useful starting point in the development of a model to test the impact of
different coal conversion strategies.6 6
Figure 32 shows the same run as Figure 31 the regulated case, but
with noise multipliers added to the system. The mean standard deviations
of the noise multipliers have been estimated from the regressions per-
formed in Chapter IV. The exact form of the noise multipliers are shown
66) A study of the dynamics of coal conversion will be conducted in 1972
by the staff of the Dartmouth Research Program on the Management of
Technology and Public Policy.
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in Appendix IV, with one exception--the uncertainty in the size of gas re-
serves discovered has been assumed to affect discovery rate DR directly,
and not the cost of exploration as is assumed in the synthetic data ana-
lyses. An examination of Figure 32 shows that although the noise inputs
have visible influence, the system's overall behavior is hardly affected.
In fact, the stock of proven reserves PR acts as a buffer which filters
out the short-term variations in discovery and usage. The behavior over
time of unproven and proven reserves is almost identical in the two runs.
Effect of an Increase in the Estimate of Unproven Reserves
The simplest, and until recently, the most popular response to the
energy crisis is to say that there is no crisis in fuel supply. It is
often suggested that the estimate of initial unproven reserves is wrong,
and that there are considerably more reserves to be found than the current
estimates indicate. Figure 33 shows the behavior of the model under price
regulation when the estimate of initial unproven reserves UPRI is doubled
to 2,080 trillion cubic feet of gas, corresponding to estimates based on
the Zapp hypothesis. 67 Note that the vertical level and rate scales of
Figure 32 have changed by a factor of two. The principal effect of doubl-
ing initial reserves is to allow the exponential growth of discovery rate
DR and usage rate UR to continue for an additional ten years. In this
time, discovery rate DR, proven reserves PR, and usage rate UR reach twice
their values in Figure 31 where initial unproven reserves UPRI is only
1,040 trillion cubic feet.. This run exhibits an important aspect of the
67) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1969), p. 188.
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behavior of exponential growth--the general model behavior is relatively
insensitive to changes in the initial values of parameters. With the
assumption of exponential growth in usage rate UR, doubling the estimate
of reserves would allow only a ten-year postponement of the time when
usage is forced to decline.
This run is also a rough representation of the behavior of the system
in response to a large increase in future imports of natural gas. Expand-
ing the system boundaries to include other countries and permitting large
scale imports simply has the effect of increasing the initial value of
unproven reserves (and probably shifting their relationship to cost). The
actual value of unproven reserves in the case of imports would be determin-
ed by the world estimates of reserves and the total amount each country is
willing to export to the U.S.
Effects of an Alaska Discovery
A likely future influence on the system is a large discovery of natu-
ral gas in Alaska in conjunction with the oil strikes already made there.
Hubbert has estimated that as much as 150 trillion cubic feet of gas may
68
be discovered there. Figure 34 shows the effects on behavior of the
regulated run if that amount of natural gas were discovered in Alaska
around 1975. This discovery can be simulated by changing the cost of
exploration curve to reflect a period of lower costs after 1975, and by
increasing the initial value of unproven reserves to 1,190 trillion cubic
feet. The effects as shown in Figure 34 are a dramatic increase in
68) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1969), p. 193.
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discoveries up until 1987, allowing usage rate UR to continue climbing
six years longer than without the discovery, or until 1987. Thus usage
rate UR and discovery rate DR peak at higher values than without the
discovery (Figure 31), but the net result is a postponement of the limi-
tations on growth in usage for only a few years.
Effects of a Change in Growth of Potential Demand
Suppose through a large campaign to conserve resources it were pos-
sible to decrease the growth rate of potential demand from seven percent
to two percent after 1970. Would this significantly extend the period
of abundance in supply of natural gas? Figure 35 shows the effects of
this policy on the regulated case (Figure 31). Discovery rate DR is
virtually unaffected immediately after 1970, for there is already much
desire for new reserves due to the low reserve-production ratio RPR, and
further increases in potential demand only makes the situation worse.
Usage rate UR peaks at the 1970 value and begins to fall, but not as
quickly as in the seven percent growth case. The effects of the lower
growth rate in potential demand on usage rate UR are partially offset by
the higher reserve-production ratio RPR which puts less restrictions on
usage rate UR through the usage supply multiplier. The net result is a
lower peak in usage rate UR and a slower decline, postponing the deple-
tion of unproven reserves to 10 percent of their initial value by about
ten years.
Effects of an Improvement in Exploration Technology
Suppose that in 1972 the U.S. gas industry stepped up its research
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effort and greatly advanced the technology of exploration and extraction.
One example of the result of such an effort might be increased efficiency
of extraction through use of underground nuclear explosions. This policy
can be simulated by holding the cost of exploration down near the 1972
level until almost all of the unproven reserves have been discovered.
Figure 36 shows the behavior of the regulated case when an increase in
technology holds down exploration costs for several years beyond 1972.
The lower costs cause an increase in discoveries through 1981, for lower
costs provide a higher return on investment. Usage rate UR continues to
grow until 1982 and then falls abruptly as average wellhead price AWP
rises steeply in response to cost increases. Costs rise when the fraction
of unproven reserves remaining approaches zero. The overall effect of a
large improvement in technology is to increase the severity of the even-
tual shortage. Usage and discovery rates rise longer with technology
but fall very steeply as unproven reserves are nearly depleted.
Government Subsidy of Exploration Costs
To alleviate the supply problems caused by declining discoveries it
has been suggested that the government subsidize the gas industry's explor-
ation costs. Figure 37 shows the effects on the regulated run of a 25
percent government subsidy of exploration enacted in 1972. It can be seen
that the subsidy accomplishes its objective, but only in the short run.
Discoveries increase up until 1978, and then fall, for rising costs of
exploration again discourage investment in discovery. Usage rate UR rises
for a few years more than without a subsidy (Figure 31), but again falls
due to producer restrictions on supply caused by the low reserve-production
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ratio RPR. The net result of the subsidy on exploration is therefore to
provide only a short-run solution to the supply problem. The long-term
supply of natural gas remains virtually unchanged.
Effects of De-Regulation in 1975
Figure 38 shows the behavior of the model if the regulated run (Figure
31) were de-regulated in 1972. De-regulation is simultated by functions
which return the average wellhead price AWP and usage rate UR to their
unregulated values. In order to avoid a discontinuous rise in new contract
price NCP, the de-regulated value of new contract price NCP is assumed to
be a delayed function of unregulated new contract price UNCP.
The immediate effect of the rise in new contract prices is the sti-
mulation of discoveries through increased return on investment. This is
short-lived, however, for as unproven reserves approach zero, the cost of
exploration rises rapidly. Usage rate UR rises immediately after 1975,
for the increase in discoveries increases the reserve-production ratio RPR,
allowing producers to sell more gas. The rapidly rising average wellhead
price AWP depresses usage rate UR more severely than in the regulated case
(Figure 31) after 1980, causing proven reserves to remain high through
2050. Thus de-regulation of the industry is consistent with long-term
supply goals, sacrificing immediate usage for possible future usage.
Summary of Policy Effects
The effects of the various policies and sensitivity tests on the
behavior of the system are summarized in Table 2. It is important to
remember that in evaluating a policy, it is the relative effects of the
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policy compared to a baseline case which has the most validity. Thus,
for instance, a valid evaluation of the effects of regulation on discovery
rate DR might be that regulation reduces the peak value of discovery rate
DR by 25 percent, and forces discovery rate DR to peak twelve years earlier
than if no regulation had occurred.
EFFECT OF POLICY
POLICY
1) Unregulated
2) Ceiling Price Regulation
3) Double unproven reserves
4) Alaska Discovery
5) 2 percent growth rate
in 1970
6) Technology Improvement
in 1972
7) 25 percent Subsidy on
exploration in 1972
8) De-Regulation in 1972
- Dii..nvarv RatsPek-ale Rat
Peak Value3(trillion ft3
28
21
38
28
21
23
21
32
Average
rice ANP
0O/Mcf
Peak Value3(trillion ft
21
22
44
28
21
'26
23
24
Turning
Point
1972
1960
1972
1987
1960
1980
1978
1978
Usage Rate
Turning
Point
1975
1980
1990
1987
1972
1983
1981
1978
Proven Reserves
Peak Value3(trillion ft
270
250
450
250
250
250
250
260
Turning
Point
1978
1967
1977
1967
1967
1967
1967
1984
Time when
Wellhead P1
exceeds 5(
1980
1986
1996
1991
1991
1988
1986
1983
TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF POLICIES ON SYSTEM BEHAVIOR
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As finite, nonrenewable resources continue to be depleted at expo-
nentially increasing rates, industry and government policy makers (such
as the FPC) are becoming more aware of the need to adopt a long-term view-
point in policy planning. In order to test the long-term effects of
policies on resource supply, managers need explicit planning tools such
as dynamic simulation models, Several existing models of the U.S. natural
gas industry have been surveyed and found to be inadequate for long-term
testing.
In response to this need for long-term resource planning models, a
dynamic model of the discovery process of U.S. natural gas is presented
in Chapter III. In order to fully incorporate all the available data in
the model, an extensive analysis of the model's nonlinear table functions
is included in Chapter IV. It is important to note that although the
resulting model fits existing data better after this analysis, the rela-
tive effects of various policies on the major behavior modes of the model
remain unchanged.
General Conclusions
The most fundamental conclusion to be drawn from the behavior of the
model is that in the case of finite, nonrenewable resources such as the
fossil fuels, the normal behavior mode is an initial period of unrestrict-
ed growth in production, a turning point when growth is slowed, and finally
a period during which there is a decline in production. This conclusion has
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been drawn by others.69 However, the type of model developed here does
offer an unprecedented experimental tool for determining how various tech-
nological, physical, economic, and political factors might alter the pat-
tern of growth and decline.
The exact timing of the turning point and the magnitude of production
at that point is determined by many factors, including, for instance, the
growth rate of potential usage rate UR, the initial level of unproven
reserves, and the shape of the exploration cost curve. However, once the
structure or interrelationships of these elements has been determined,
the behavior of the model and the time of decline is remarkably insensi-
tive to small changes in system parameter values. For instance, an in-
crease by a factor of two in the actual quantity of initial inproven re-
serves results in a postponement of the turning point in supply by only
ten years. A 25 percent subsidy on exploration postponris the turning
point for only three years.
If a decline in supply is unavoidable, it is imperative that we think
about how we want to allocate our available resources: should we take pre-
cautions that some modest but useful amount of the scarce resource be
available over the long term, or should we encourage the immediate use of
the resource to postpone the decline in usage? It appears from the runs
made that the short-term advantages of policies such as regulation or sub-
sidies toward the postponement of decline in usage are minimal. The model
supports the claims of the industry spokesmen that depressed price through
regulation tends to depress discoveries in the short run. But it is also
apparent that the industry was nearing a period of limitations in supply
69) M.K. Hubbert, Op. Cit. (1969), p. 167.
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regardless of regulation. In addition, price regulation carries a large
penalty in terms of long-term supply--a low price encourages demand and
thus usage, greatly reducing the long-term level of available proven
reserves.
The particular schedule of gas consumption most consistent with our
national goals depends on many factors outside the gas industry. Probably
most important is the achievement of an orderly transition over the next
century from primary dependence on fossil fuels to reliance on some re-
newable or essentially infinite energy resource (eg. solar or fussion
power). The model described here is not designed to suggest how quickly
gas reserves should be used--that is a political issue--but once society
has identified its short and long-term goals, the model does permit one
to compare the relative effectiveness of alternative policies in achiev-
ing that usage rate UR which will best serve our society's interests.
Potential for Further Research
The economic impact of a future decline in production rate of domestic
natural gas depends on the possibilities for substitution of other fuels
for gas, and on the amount of services rendered by a unit of gas as it is
used to produce final products. Substitution of other fuels for gas is
implicit in the model in the relationship of average wellhead price AWP to
demand for gas--as price rises, it is assumed that consumers switch to
other fuels. A valuable extension of this research would be to represent
explicitly the process of substitution by combining the gas model with a
model of production and consumption of some other resource, like coal,
which is a substitute for natural gas. Then one could study the research
and investment policies which would facilitate an orderly shift of demand
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away from gas and towards a greater reliance on the substitute. An endo-
genous technology sector like that developed by Behrens [Behrens (1971)]
would also be needed in order to represent the delays inherent in deve-
loping sufficient technologies of substitution.
The central goal of this project has been to integrate the many geo-
logical and economic processes which determine the investment and discov-
ery of domestic natural gas over an extended period. In order to study
more completely the factors controlling the flow of a resource from un-
proven reserves to pollution or solid waste, this model could be extended
to explicitly represent technological changes which affect a resource
system. Such a project has been proposed in 1972 to the National Science
Foundation as a part of Dartmouth College's Research Program on the
Management of Technology and Public Policy. It is the goal of the pro-
posed project to work closely with user agencies such as the Department
of the Interior, and to develop disaggregated models useful in forming
long-term resource management policies.
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APPENDIX I
COMPLETE LIST OF MODELING ISSUES CRITICAL TO THE FPC 70
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
NATIONAL GAS SURVEY
All of the issues to be considered are not necessarily limited to the
following list:
1. Estimated proven and potential gas reserves for the next two de-
cades and the magnitude thereof relative to other energy sources to meet
the projected gas requirements.
2. Economic basis for additions to reserves.
3. The present and estimated future market requirements for gas, in-
cluding gas for feed stocks for the next two decades to the year 1990.
4. Supply-demand price relationships.
5. Price structures and interfuel competition.
6. Impact of environmental standards on gas production, transmission,
distribution and markets, including the role of gas in the environment.
Environmental legislation can have a great influence on our lives of
tomorrow. The continued growth in power consumption is now projected to
increase by 450 percent by 1990 which would mean according to some exper-
tises "an intolerable air pollution, radiation hazards and the ruination
of our landscape" unless proper fuels are made available and such properly
used.
7. Current and projected reserves and production needed to fulfill
predicted market requirements.
8. The capital required to meet the projected demands for all three
phases of the gas industry. These funds will not be in the magnitude of
millions but shall be in billions of dollars.
9. Present and future adequacy and efficiency of all facilities
required for production, transmission and distribution of gas.
10. Prospective technological improvements and ample funds for research
and development.
70) FPC private communication.
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11. Possible new gas sources to supplement the conventional domestic
reserves such as gas from Mexico, Canada, Alaska and the Arctic Islands.
Other sources of gas to be considered are liquified natural gas, coal
gasification, gas from oil and oil shales and tar sands, and gas from
nuclear stimulation including a determination of the anticipated volumes
which could be derived from each with present and improved technology.
Investments required to produce gas from these alternate sources,
prices to be charged for such, necessary lead time to make these gases
available, ownership and location of these sources and where conversion
plants are required, the accessibility of such to the markets.
12. Determine from the projected natural gas supply versus projected
gas requirements to 1990 the necessary gas facilities to meet the increas-
ing market demands, both national and regional, and the capital require-
ments associated therewith, including, among other factors, required drill-
ing, adequacy of inventory level of gas reserves, and the capability of
pipelines and distributing systems, individually and collectively, as
pertinent to supply and market areas, including the magnitude of gas re-
sources and reserves relative to other energy sources.
13. The impact of regulation and other governmental influences on
natural gas demand and supply and the possible effect of changes in govern-
mental policies, including such areas of consideration as supply-price
relationships; regulatory policy with regard to pipelines' rate of return,
depreciation with tax treatment in rate proceedings; environmental pol-
lution abatement; gas imports and exports; mandatory oil import controls;
laws and customs controlling international trade and legislative actions
in such matters as treaties, conventions and the Jones Act; national se-
curity; balance of payments; taxes, including depletion allowance; leasing
of lands in the public domain; public safety; research and development;
and the conservation practices in being in the respective gas producing
states.
14. The long-range potential for cost reduction and possible patterns
of development in production, transmission and distribution of natural gas,
including, among other factors, economies of scale, increased use of stor-
age, technological developments, a more comprehensive statistics and infor-
mation system, interconnections, remote control operations, load factor
improvement, and improved appliances and equipment.
15. The Survey may indicate upon its completion that new guidelines
and revisions to the Natural Gas Act, FPC regulatory policy and possible
changes in federal legislation may be in order.
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APPENDIX II: HISTORICAL DATA
Cost of Exploration
(1)
Cost of Exploration,
Gas & Oil
(Billions 1958 $)
1.05
1.25
1.77
2.10
2.13
2.24
1.98
1.99
1.78
2.21
1.73
(2)
Gas Wells
Oil &
Gas Wells
.191
.115
.114
.128
.103
.124
.165
.197
.210
.215
.187
(3)
Cost/Well Gas
Cost/Well Total
1.8
1.8
1.8
est
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.88
1.87
1.74
1.66
1.68
(4)
Investment in
Exploration =
1X2X3
(Billions 1958 $2
Sources: American Petroleum Institute,et. al., Joint Association Survey of
Industry Drilling Costs, and American Gas Association, Gas Facts.
The cost of exploration of gas in any given year is difficult to deter-
mine because of the joint nature of expenditures for gas and oil. For the
purposes of this study, however, an estimate of the cost of exploration of
gas alone is needed. This cost has been derived above from total explo-
ration cost by allocating gas exploration cost according to the number of
gas wells drilled as a percentage of total oil and gas wells drilled. This
value is then weighted by the cost/well of gas wells relative to the
cost/well of all wells drilled. The resulting product is the year's
investment in exploration. The discoveries resulting from this invest-
Year
1944
1948
1951
1953
1955
1956
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Fraction of
Unproven
Reserves
Remaining
(5)
Discoveries,
Year + 5
(Trillion ft3 )
12.7
20.5
24.7
18.9
13.9
17.2
20.3
21.3
20.2
21.8
13.7
(6)
Cost of
Exploration -
4/5
(¢/Mcf)
2.84
1.27
1.46
2.54
2.81
2.91
3.01
3.44
3.22
3.44
3.94
--- ,
,
- -. ------- ~--- I -- --- ~111----~ ~c~e~ '~-- --~II
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ment are taken from data five years later, because of the approximate
five-year lag in the effects of investment. The investment in exploration
divided by the resulting discoveries gives an estimate of the year's cost
of exploration.
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Price Multiplier
(1)
Average
Wellhead
Price
(1958 ¢/Mcf)
7.68
7.77
8.08
8.43
9.87
10.7
11.5
11.8
12.3
12.9
14.2
(2)
Cost of
Exploration,
t-10 (simulated)
(1958 ¢/Mcf)
2.03
2.05
2.07
2.10
2.13
2.15
2.18
2.20
2.24
2.29
2.32
(3)
Total Cost =
3.7 X (2)
(1958 ¢/Mcf)
7.51
7.59
7.66
7.77
7.87
7.95
8.06
8.15
8.28
8.46
8.60
(4)
Price
Multiplier
= (1) / (3)
1.02
1.02
1.05
1.09
1.25
1.35
1.43
1.45
1.49
1.53
1.65
(5)
Reserve-
Production
Ratio RPR
(Years)
33.3
29.6
26.0
24.9
25.2
24.2
23.8
23.6
23.1
23.0
21.8
Sources: American Gas Association, Gas Facts, and API, et. al., Joint
Association Survey of Industry Drilling Costs.
Year
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
_ _~ _ ~ ~ _ I_ _ _ _
- -- -- -~---
,
- -
------- ---- I---
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Demand Multiplier
Usage Rate3
(Trillion ft )
3.92
4.03
4.58
5.15
5.42
6.28
7.46
8.01
8.40
8.74
9.41
10.08
10.68
11.03
12.05
Average Wellhead
Price
(1958 c/Mcf)
7.81
7.95
7.71
7.76
7.68
7.77
8.08
8.43
9.87
10.7
11.5
11.8
12.3
13.9
14.2
Source: American Gas Association, Gas Facts.
Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
w I --------- -- I m I-
I I
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Usage Supply Multiplier
(3)
(2) In (Usage
(1) In (UR ) + Supply Multiplier) Usage Supply
Year in (Usage Rate t)  .066 (1991-t) (2) - 2.584 Multiplier
1960 2.542 2.608 .024 1.024
1961 2.584 2.584 0 1.000
1962 2.631 2.565 -.019 .981
1963 2.691 2.559 -.025 .975
1964 2.738 2.540 -.044 .957
1965 2.776 2.512 -.072 .930
1966 2.845 2.515 -.079 .931
1967 2.899 2.503 -.081 .922
1968 2.962 2.500 -.084 .919
1969 3.030 2.502 -.082 .921
1970 3.070 2.476 -.108 .898
Source: American Gas Association, Gas Facts.
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APPENDIX III: SYNTHETIC DATA ANALYSIS
The purpose of the synthetic data analysis performed on the natural
gas model is to determine the presence of any significant bias in the
coefficients of the table functions obtained from OLS regression. Bias
can occur due to the feedback loop structure of the system, which violates
the OLS assumption that each independent variable is exogenous.
To create the synthetic data, noise multipliers were added to the
table function equations for cost of exploration COE, percent invested in
exploration PIIE, price multiplier PM, demand multiplier DM, and usage
supply multiplier USM. The noise multiplier equations take the form:
A CNM.K = SAMPLE (NORMRN (1,.286) ,1,1)
A INM.K = SAMPLE (NORMRN (1,.152) ,1,1)
A PNM.K = SAMPLE (NORMRN (1,.107) ,1,1)
A DNM.K = SAMPLE (NORMRN (1,.045) ,1,1)
A UNM.K = SAMPLE (NORMIN (1,.020) ,1,1)
where SAMPLE is a sample-and-hold function with initial value equal to 1.0,
sample interval equal to one year, and subsequent values equal to NORMRN.
NORMRN generates random numbers normally distributed with mean equal to 1.0,
and standard deviation SD derived directly from the regressions on histor-
ical data with the formula:
-1
SD = log e (SD regression ) - 1
This takes into account the logarithmic form of the data regressions.
The regressions on the historical data reported in Appendix II take
the form:
In (COEt) = 3.9 - 1.6 In ( 10 * FURR t )  R2 = .51, SER = .262
(.96) (.52)
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In (10 * PIIEt) = -2.21 + 1.14 In (RPRt) - .022 in (10 * NCPt/TCt)(1.49) (.73) (.35)
R = .56, SER = .142
In (AWPt/COEt_-10) = 1.39 - 1.25 in (RPRt/10)
(.25) (.27)
in (UUR t) = 2.46 - .56 in (AWP t) + .llt
(.28) (.14) (.0074)
in (USMt) = -.65 + .21 In (RPRt )(.11)(.038)
R2 = .71,
R2 = .99,
R2 = .78,
SER = .104
SER = .044
SER = .020
To perform the synthetic data analysis, three sets of synthetic data
were created by varying the DT slightly in the model, thus changing the
random generation function NORMRN so that a new distribution is created.
An example of the synthetic data created by the model is given in Table
AIII-1.
The regressions on synthetic data were done with data from the same
years as the regressions on historical data (Appendix II)71 for comparison
with the historical coefficients in order to estimate bias. The results
of the synthetic data repressions are as follows:
Cost of Exploration
(1) in (COEt ) = 4.37 - 1.88 in (10 * FURRt )(.76) (.41)
(2) In (COEt ) = 3.68 - 1.49 In (10 * FURRt)(.57 (.31)
2
R = .70, SER =
R = .72, SER = .173
72) Except for the price multiplier, PM, for reasons explained in Chapter
IV. Synthetic data was used from the period 2006-2018, when RPR varies
from 18-24 years, in the case of the price multiplier PM.
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(3) In (COE t ) = 3.12 - 1.23 In (10 * FURRt)(1.28) (.69)
AVE: In (COE t ) = 3.73 - 1.53 In (10 * FURRt )
Percent Invested in Exploration
2
R = .26, SER = .365
(1) In (10 * PIIEt)
2
R2=
(2) In (10 , PIIEt)
=-3.97 + 1.95 In (RPR ) - .115 in (10 * NCP /TC )
(5.23) (3.08) (1.46) t t
.56, SER = .142
= -0.460 - 0.135 in (RPR t ) + 0.814 In (10 * NCPt/TC t)
(2.87) (1.55) (.694)
R2 = .59, SER = .149
(3) In (10 * PIIEt ) = -2.35 + 1.65 in (RPRt) - 0.412 In (10 * NCPt/TCt)
(. / .33)
R2 =
(z.96) (L.6b/)
.30, SER = .127
Price Multiplier (Model Linear in range RPR = 18-24 years):
(1) PM - 5.58 - 0.182 RPR
(.637) (.031)
(2) PM = 5.67 - 0.178 RPR
(.940) (.0445)
(3) PM = 4.83 - 0.136 RPR
2
R = .85,
2
R = .73,
2R
SER = .176
SER = .289
.62, SER = .259
AVE: PMt = 5.36 
- 0.165 RPRt
Note: Model Assumes PM = 5.35 - .167 RPR t when RPR t varies from 18-24tt t
years.
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t
(.903) (.0435)
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Demand Multiplier (Model linear in region AWP = 10 - 20 C/Mcf):
(1) DM = 1.33 - 0.0342 AWP R =-
t (.138) (.0109)
(2) DMt = 1.41 - 0.0400 AWP t
(.120) (.0092)
(3) DMt = 1.29 - 0.0316 AWP t
(.119) (.0094)
.42,
2R = .58,
2
R = .45,
SER = 0.481
SER = 0.0428
SER = 0.0391
AVE: DM = 1.35 - .0352 AWPtt t
Note: Model Assumed DMt = 1.4 - .04 AWPt when AWPt varied from 10-20 C/Mcf
when this analysis was done. Since then, a logarithmic table function for
Demand Multiplier has been incorporated (see Appendix IV).
Usage Supply Multiplier
(1) In (USM t ) = -0.631 + 0.206 In (RPR t )(.238) (.0857)
(2) In (USM t ) = -0.803 + 0.272 In (RPR t )
(.139) (.0496)
(3) In (USMt) = -0.613 + 0.199 In (RPR t )(.154) (.0560)
AVE: In (USMt) = -0.682 + 0.226 In (RPRt).
Historical Data Regression gives:
in (USMt) = -0.653 + 0.213 In (RPRt)(.107) (.038)
2R = .39,
2R = .77,
2
R = .58,
SER = .0336
SER = .0184
SER = .0196
2
R = .78, SER = .0200
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APPENDIX IV: LISTING OF COMPUTER PROGRAM
UPR.K=UIPR.,J+(DT) (-t)R.JK)
UPR=UPRI
UPRI =1.04E15
UPR - UNPROVEN RE
DT - TIM4E INCREM
D R
IjPRI
SERVES
ENT :SE
- DISCOVERY RATE (C
- UNPROVEN RESERVES
(CUIBIC FEET)
TWEEN CALCULATIONS
U1,IC FEET/YEAR)
INITIAL (CUIIC FE
FURR .K=UPR. K/UPR I
FURR - FRACTION OF UNPROVEN RESERVES REtMAINING
(D IMENS IONLESS)
UPR - UNPROVEN RESERVES (CUBIC FEET)
UPRI - UNPROVEN RESERVES INITIAL (CUBIC FEET)
COE.K=TABHL(COET, LOGN(10*FURR. K),-3.5, 2.5,.5)*
(COEN)*(CNH. K)
COEN=1E-5
COET=1.3E4/6E3/2.7E3/1E3/545/245/110/50/22/9.98/
2, A
3, A
3.1, C
3.2, T
48/2.02/.91
COE - COST OF EXPLORATION (DOLL.ARS/CUBIC FOOT)
TABHiL - TERM DENOT I NG P- TABULAR RELAT I ONSHIP
COET - COST OF EXPLORATION TABLE
LOGN - NATURAL LOGARITHMIC FUNCTION
FURR - FRACTION OF UNPROVEN RESERVES REMAINING
(DIMENSIONLESS)
COEN - COST OF EXPLORATION NORMAL (DOLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
CNM - COST NOISE tMUJLTIPLIER (DIMENSIONLESS)
TC.K=(MAR)(COE.K)
fIAR=3.7
TC - TOTA
SMAR - COST
COE - COST
L COST (DOLLARS/
MARGI N (DI MENS I
OF EXPLORATION
CUBIC FOOT)
ONLESS)
(DOLLARS/CUBIC
4, A
4.1,
FOOT)
NCP. K=S3!I
NCP
S1JITC
TC i (UtJNCP. K, RNCP. K SW) 5
- NEW CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLAPS/CUJDIC FOOT)
1I - FUNCTION WtHOSE VALUE IS SET INITIALLY !BY
ANALYST
UNCP - UNREGULATED NEW CONTRACT PRICE (COLLARS/
CUBIC FOOT)
RNCP - REGULATED NEU CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLAPS/CUBIC
FOOT)
Si1l - REGULATION SWITCH
UNCP. K=(TC. K) (PIM!. K)
UNCP - UNREGULATED NEW CONTRACT PRICE (
CUBIC FOOT)
TC - TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
PM - PRICE MUtLTIPLIER (DIMENSIONLESS)
6, A
DOLLARS/
1, L
1.1,
1.2,
(YEARS)
ET)
4.
# A
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. K=CLIP(IMAX(RP. K, DTC. K), UNCP. K,TI tE.K, 1955) 7
RNCP - REGULATED NEU CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/CU
FOOT)
CLIP - FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE CHANGES DURI NG RUN
MAX - FUNCTION WHICH CHOOSES THE MAXIMUMl OF Tti
ARGUMENTS
RP - REGULATION PRICE SCHEDULE (0OLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
DTC - DELAYED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
UNCP - UNREGULATED NEWI CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/
CUBIC FOOT)
TIME - TIME (YEARS)
RP.K=TABHiL (TRP, T I MtE. K, 1955, 1964,9)*( 3 i-4)
TRP=1.95/1.6
RP
TABILL
TRP
T IME
REGULATION PRICE SCHEDULE (DOLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
TERM DENOTING A TABULAR RELATIONSHIP
REGULATED PRICE SCHEDULE TABLE
TIME (YEARS)
DTC. K=DELAY3(TC. K, REGD)
REGD=4
DTC - DELAYED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FONT)
DELAY3 - TERH DENOTING A LAGGED RELATIONSýHIP
TC - TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CU.!IC FOOT)
REGD - REGULATION DELAY (YEARS)
0
8, A
8.1,
9, A
9.1,
AWP. K=SW I TCH( UAWP. K, RAl.IP. K, S1I1)
AWP - AVERAGE WlELL!IEAD PRICE (DOLL
SWITCH - FUNCTION IHOSE VALUE IS SET
ANALYST
tUAIIP - UNREGULATEI) AVERAGE '!ELL! EAD)
(DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
RAWP - REGULATED AVERAGE WlELL'HEAD P
CISRIC FOOT)
SW1, - REGULATION SWITCH
UA,,P. K=DELAY3(NCP. K, PAD. K)
UAI/P - UNREGULATED AVERAGE 1iELLiHEADi
(DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
DELAY3 - TERM DENOTING A LAGGED RELAT
NCP - NEWJ CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/
PAD - PRICE AVERAGING DELAY (YEARS
A S/CUBIC
I NITIALLY
In,
FOOT)
DY
PRI CE
RICE (DOLLARS/
PRICE
11, A
I ONSH I P
CU.BIC FOOT)
)
RNCP
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RAWP. K=CLIP( MAX(Pb6O, TC. K), UAWP. K,TIf1E. K, 1960 )
P60=1.5E-4
RAiP
CLI P
MAX
P60
STC
UA•IVP
TI ME
STC. K=E LAY
STC
DELAY3
TC
PAD
PAD. K=RPR. K
PAl)
RPR
SR.K=(UR
SR
UR
AUP
IE.K=( P
I IE
SR
- REGULATED AVERAGE WELLHIEAD PRICE (DOLLARS
CU IC FOOT)
- FUNCTION I/l;OSE VALUE CiHANGES OURZI NC RUN
- FUNCTION WiI ICH CHOOSES TH:E MAX IIIU , OF TWO
ARGUtlENTS
- CEILING PRICE SET IN 1960 (DOLLARS/CUBIC
FOOT)
- SMOOTHED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUJrIC FOOT)
- UNREGULATED AVERAGE 1•ELLHtEAD PRICE
(DOLLAPS/CUJBIC FOOT)
- TIE (YEARS)
7
12, A
12.1, C
/
(TC. K, PAD. K) 1, A
SHOOTHED TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CU3BIC FOOT)
TERMI DENOTING A LAGGED RELATIONSHIP
TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
PRICE AVERAGING DELAY (YEARS)
- PRICE AVERAGING DELAY (YEARS)
- RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
.JK)(AtJP. K)
- SALES REVENUE (DOLLARS)
- USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
- AVLRAGE WELLHEAD PRICE (DOLLARS/CUSIC
IIE.K)(SR.K)
- INVESTMENT IN
- PERCENT INVEST
- SALES REVENUE
14, A
15, A
FOOT)
16, A
EXPLORATION (DOLLARS)
ED IN EXPLORATION (FRACTION)
(DOLLARS)
E. K=TABII
I NM. K)
ET=. 5/.5
PIIE
TABHL
PI IET
R PR
DRPR
ROIM
I NM
L(PI IET, RPR.K/ iRPR,.2, 2.0,.2)*(ROIMI.K)* I
/.5/.4P/.39/. 24/. 12/.05/. 01/0 1
- PERCENT INVESTED IN EXPLORATION (FRACTIO
- TERM DENOTING A TABULAR RELATIONSHIP
- PERCENT INVESTED IN EXPLORATION TABLE
- RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
- DESIRED RESERVE-PROnUCTInN RATIn (YEARS)
- RETURN ON INVESTIIENT MULTIPLIER
(DIMENSI ONLESS)
- INVESTIENT NOISE SEMULTIPLIER (DIMHENSSIONLE
RO I M. K=TABHL(RO I tT, NCP. K/TC. K, 0,2.2,.2)
RO IMT=O/.08/.25/.44/. 55/. 67/. 76/. 2/. /.92/.96/1
ROIM - RETURN ON INVESTMENT MIULTIPLIER
(DIMENSIONLESS)
TABIHL - TERM DENOTING A TABULAR RELATIONS:IIP
ROIMT - RETURN ON INVESTIMENT MULTIPLIER TABLE
NCP - NE]! CONTRACT PRICE (DOLLARS/CUSIC FOOT)
TC - TOTAL COST (DOLLARS/CUBIC FOOT)
7, A
7.1,
N)
SS)
18, A
PII
PiI
SS)
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LBR.KL=DELAY3(I IE. K/COE. K, D)
LD=4. 5
DR - DISCOVERY RATE
DELAY3 - TERM DENOTING A
I IE - INVEST•EENT IN E
COE - COST OF EXPLORA
[,D - DISCOVERY DELAY
PR. K=PR. J+(DT) (D,R. JK-U .J ) K
PR= PRI
PRPI = . 4E12
PR - PROVEN FrESERVES
DT - T I1E INCREIENT
DR - DISCOVEPRY RATE
U - USAGE RATE (CLUJ,
P I - PROVEN RESERVES
4UR. ;K= SrfOOTI (UR. J K, AURAD )
AUP =AUR I
AURI =3.2E1
AURAD=1
AUR - AVERAGE USAGE '
SMOOTTN - FIR ST -OSTDER E XP
UR - USAGE RATE (CUtM
AURAD - AVERAGE USAGE R
AURI - AVERAGE USAGE r
YEA r•)
(CU IC FEET/YEA%
LAGGErn RELATI 7 1iJS I1 P
XPLORATION (rnL LAI:S )
TION ()DO()LLAPS/C!!U C F
(YEARS)
(CULBIC FEET)
E[ET':EEN- CALCULA TIO 0-S
(CIUBIC FEET/YEAR)
IC FEET/YEAR)
INITIAL (CUDIC FEET)
10, R
19.1, C
20, L
20.1,
20.2,
(YEAPS)
21, A
2 1. 1,
2 1. 2,
2 7, &#
ATE (CU!:!C FEET/YEAR)
ONENTIAL SVInOTHING FUNCTION
IC FEET/YEAR)
ATE ADJUSTENT DELAY (YEARS)
ATE 1HITIAL (CH'3IC "EET/
RPR, =PR.K/AU,. K
DRPR=20
RPR
AUBR
DRPB
- RESERVE-W•oOD)ICTION PATI
- PROVEN RESERVES (CUBRIC
- AVERACGE USAGE RATE (CUB
- DESIRED RESERVE-PRODUCT
( YEA " S )
T)
FEET/','EAP)
rATIG (YE
=TABH!L (PMiT, RP R . K/RPR, ,1 . 3 ) * (PNp . i K
u:/5.5/3.75/2.35/1.35/1/1
PMI - PR ICE O!ULT I PLI ER ( DI ENSIONLESS )
TABI!L - TERM DEIIOT I NG A TABFULAR , ELATI ONS: I P
PMT - PRICE MULTIPLIER TAIBLE
RPR - RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATIO (YEARS)
DRPR - DESIRED RiES ERVE-PR!ODUCT IO , RATIO (YE
PNMt - PRICE NO ISE MtULT I PLIE R (Dti ENSIONLES
[Ri. K=TABHL (
DiU, T=2. 1/1. 5
5.5E-3/ 1.
DIH
TABI[ L
Dt4T
LOGN
AD IP
F)Nr·
D 1T, LOGN(A P . K*1E5 ), , P . 5,. 5 ) *(DN',. )
9/1. 21/. 9/. 6FI/. 5/. 24/. 14/. ' T7/. rn31/. 14/
5E-3/2E-4/1. 7E-5/0
- DEiAND N IULTI PLIER (Dt  E!SESIONLESS)
24, A
2 4 . 1,
- TER'. DENiOT I NG A TABULAn PrELAT IONS'"IIP
- DEMAND 1MULTIPLIER TABLE
- NATURAL LOGAR I THI,'IC FUNCTION
- AVERAGE UIELLHEAD PRICE (DOLLABS/CU BIC FOOT)
- DEIAND NOISE •lLTIPLIEP (r1W EUSI i LESS)
PI T
r-PlT=
22, A
22.1,
ARS)
23, A
23. 1,
As PS)
- DESIRED RESERVE-ppn 1) UC I -',ATIrj ( E
ORP1. K=URI *EXP(GC*(T IME. K-1900) )
GC=.0657
URI =3.2E11
TIME=1900
URP1
UIR I
EXP
G, C
TIM E
- NORMAL POTENTIAL USAGE RATE (CUBIC F
YEAR)
- USAGE RATE INITIAL (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
- EXPONENTIAL FUNCTION
- GROWTH CONSTANT (FRACTION)
- TIME (YEARS)
USM. K=TABHL (USHT, RPR. K/DRPR, 0, 2,. 2)*
USMT=0/. 12/. 7/.86/.95/1/1.02/1.04/1.
USM - USAGE SUPPLY MULT I PL I ER
TABHL - TERM DENOTING A TA.JlLAP
USMT - USAGE SUPPLY MULTIPLIER
RPR - RESERVE-PRODUCTION RATI
DRPR - DESIRED RESERVE-PRODUCT
UNM - USAGE NOISE tMULTIPLIER,
IUR. KL=S I TCHI(
UR -R
SI0ITCH -
UUR -
RUR -
Stl -
(UNM. K)
05/1. nG/1. r6
(DI MENSIONLESS)
RELATIONSHI P
TABLE
O (YEARS)
ION PATIO (YEARS
(DW IM IENSIONLESS)
UUR . K, RUR. K, SW1 )
USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE IS SET INITIALLY
ANALYST
UNREGULATED USAGE RATE (CUIIIC FEET/YE,
REGULATED USAGE RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEArD
REGULATION S\!ITCH
UUR. K=(URP. K) (Dr[!. K)
UUR - UNREGULATED USAGE
URP - USAGE RATE POTENT
DM - DEMAND MULTI PLIER
RUR. K=CL I
RUR
CLIP
USI
U U R
TIHME
26, A
25. 1,
)
27, R
B Y
Ar)
)
28, A
RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
IAL (CU31C FEET/YEAR)
( ,IM ENSI ONIL ESS)
P((USM.K) (UUR.K), UUR.K,TIME.K,19G0) 29, A
- REGULATED USAGE RATE (CUI3C FEET/YEAR)
- FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE CHIANGES IDURING RUrll
- USAGE SUPPLY IMULTIPLIER (DIMENSIONLESS)
-, UNREGULATED USAGE RATE (CUtISC FEET/YEAR)
- TIME (YEARS)
PRTPER. K=CL
PRTPER
CLIP
PRTMAX
B3T I M E
TIME
I P( , PRTfMrAX. K, JT I .',E, TI ME. K)
- VARIABLE PRINT PERIOD
- FUNCTION !,WHOSE VALUE CHIANGES
- VARIABLE VALUE OF PRINT PERI
- BEGINNING TI E 09R PRINTnTJT
- TIME (YEARS)
31, A
nDfUR I I O r7N
0 Bf
143
25,
25.
25.
25.
EET/
PRTMAX.K=CLI P( 1, 0, ETI 1E,TIiE. K)
3T I ME=19 4 5
ET I ME=19 70
PRTMIAX - VARIABLE VALUE OF
CLIP - FUNCTION WHOSE VAL!
ET I ME - END TI ME FOR PR, I NT'
TIME - TIME (YEARS)
BT I ME - iEG I NNI NG TI E !rP
URP2. K=UR2*EXP(GC2*(TIElE. K-J 1970))
UR2 1 =3. 979E13
URP2
UR21
EXP
GC 2
T I HE
PRINT PERIOD
UE CHANCIGES D
r NTnUT
- POTENTIAL USAGE RATE AFTER CHA:NGE I N
RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEA
- VALUE OF POTENITIAL UlSAGE RATE IN 1970r
(CU13 BIC FEET/YEAR)
- EXPONENTIAL FUNCTION
- NE•l GRO'TH RATIE EFFECTIVE IN 1,970
(FRACTION)
- TI-E (YEAilS)
. K=CL I P( URP 2 . K, iURP I K, TI E . K, 1970 )
URP3 - POTENTIAL USAGE RATE ~;ITH C;
1970 (CjUBIC FEET/YEAR)
CL IP - FUNCT I ON IlOSE VALUE CH ANG E
URP2 - POTENTIAL USAGE RATE AFTER
RATE (CUBIC FEET/YEA
URPP - NORMAL POTENTIAL USAGE RATE
TI ME
YEAR)
- TIlE (YEARS)
354,
iA rNGE IN , C IN
S .Uf I NG rN RUN
C'IA'CGE IN WRO !TiH
(CIll C FEET/
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32.1,
2. 2,
[! No Pr •
35, A
33.1,
ROU11T: I
URP3
URP. K=SWlI TCH(URP1. K, URP3. K, SI2)
GC2=.02
SW1=O
SW2=0
SWN=0
URP - USAGE RATE POTENTIAL (CUBIC
SWITCHI - FUNCTION JHOSE VALUE IS SET
ANALYST
URPI - NORMAL POTENTIAL USAGE RATE
YEAR)
URP3 - POTENTIAL USAGE RATE W!ITH C
1970 (CUBIC FEET/YEAR)
SW2 - GROWTH RATE StilTCH
GC2 - NE•l GROWTH RATE EFFECTIVE I
(FRACTION)
SW1 - REGULATION S!IITCH
SWN - NOISE SITCH
FEET/YEAR)
INITIALLY BY
(CUL;IC FEET/
HANGE I N GC IN
N 1970
I NM. IK=SWI TCH(
I NM -
SWI TCH -
SAMPLE -
NORMRN -
SWN -
CNM. K=SW ITCH(
CN1 -1
SWITCH -
SAMPLE -
NORMRN -
SUN -
1, SAMPLE(NORMRN ( 1, . 15 ), 1, 1),
INVESTMENT NO I SE HULT I PL I E
FUNCTION uIIHOSE VALUE IS SET
ANALYST
SAMPLE AND HOLD FUNCTION
RANDOt NOISE FIJNCTION
NOISE SWITCH
1, SAMPLE(NORMRN
COST NOISE MULT
FUNCTION WHOSE
ANALYST
SAMPLE AND HOLD
RANDOM NOISE FU
NOISE SWJITCH
(1, . 26
IPLIER
VALUE
SWN ) 37,
(DI MENSI ONLESS)
INITIALLY DY
1, 1), SiW34)
D IIENSIONLESS)
SET INITIALLY
FUNCTION
NCTION
UNIM. K=SWiI TCHt( 1, SAMPLE (NORMRN ( 1,. 02),
UNM - USAGE NOISE MULTIPLIER
S\WITCH - FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE IS
ANALYST
SAMPLE - SAMPLE AND HOLD FUNCTIO
NORMfRN - RANDOM NOISE FUNCTION
SUIN - NOISE SWITCH
1, 1), SWI.)
(DI MENS I ONLESS)
SET INITIALLY
N
PNt, . K=Sl I TCH(
PNM -
SWITCH -
SAMPLE -
NORMIRN -
SWN -
DN M. K=S! ITC( C
DNM -
SWl TCH -
SAMPLE -
NORMR N -
1, SAMPLE (NORMRN (1,. 11), 1
PRICE NOISE tlULTIPLIER (
FUNCTION WHOSFE VALU.1E IS
ANALYST
SAMPLE ANTD HOLD FUNCTION
RANDOMt NOISE FUNCTION
NOISE SWITCH
1,SAtMPLE(NOR3tRN(1,. 045),
DE'MAND NO I SE IlHULT I PL I ER
FUNCTION WHOSE VALUE IS
ANALYST
SAMPLE AND HIOLD FUNCTION
RANDOM NOISE FUNCT I ON1
NOISE SWUITCH
,1),SWN)
DI M ENS IONL ES S)
SET INITIALLY S
1,1 ), S N )
(D I ENS 1 ONLESS
SET INITIALLY
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35.1,
35.5,
35.6,
35.7,
38, A
BY
39, A
BY
40, A
Y
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